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The arbitration statute which was enacted by the legislature of
North Carolina at its last session is the Uniform Arbitration Act
which was drafted by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and recommended to the legislatures of the several states
for adoption.' It has also been formally approved by the American
Bar Association. It has been adopted in Nevada (1925), Utah
(1927), Wyoming (1927) and North Carolina (1927).
In most, if not all, important particulars this act differs from the
arbitration statutes which have been recently enacted in other juris-
dictions as follows: The United States Arbitration Act (1925), ef-
fective January 1, 1926, the New York Arbitration Law (1920), and
the arbitration statutes of New Jersey (1923), Massachusetts
(1925), Oregon (1925), Territory of Hawaii (1925), California
(1927) and Pennsylvania (1927).2
Without intending to minimize the importance of the other par-
ticulars in which the Uniform Act departs from the arbitration
statutes last cited, it is proposed to report first what appears to have
been regarded by the Commissioners and by the American Bar As-
sociation as the most important matter of difference between the
two classes of arbitration statutes. That matter of difference as-
sumes the further importance that the American Bar Association
expressly repudiated the position which it had taken on the question
in connection with the United States Arbitration Act when it ap-
proved the Uniform Act.
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale School of Law.
AUTHOR'S NOTE. The substance of this article constitutes part of a Manual
on the American Law of Commercial Arbitration which is to be published
during the current year by the Oxford University Press as one of a series of
studies in Commercial Arbitration conducted by the American Arbitration As-
sociation. This advance publication is by their courtesy.
Laws of North Carolina, 1927, Chapter 94.
For a comparative survey of these statutory provisions see, Sturges, Arbi-
tration Under The New Pennsylvania Arbitration Statute, 76 University of Pa.
Law Review, 345 (1927). See also Curtis, Comparison of Recent Arbitration
Statutes, XIII A. B. A. Journal 567 (1927).
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AGREEMENTS To ARBITRATE FUTURE DisPUTES
(a) Provisions of the Statutes.
The Uniform Arbitration Act does not embrace agreements to
arbitrate disputes which may arise between the parties in the future.
Section 1 of the act fixes its scope in this respect as follows:
"That two or more parties may agree in writing to submit to
arbitration, in conformity with the provisions of this act, any con-
troversy existing between themt at the time of the agreement to sub-
mit. Such agreement shall be valid and enforceable, and neither
party shall have power to revoke the submission without the consent
of the other party or parties to the submission save upon such
grounds as exist in law or equity for the rescission or revocation of
any contract." (Italics are the writer's.)
The United States Act, on the contrary, and the new arbitration
statutes of New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Oregon, Hawaii,
California and Pennsylvania do embrace future-disputes clauses as
well as agreements of submission of existing controversies.
This difference between the two types of statutes was the prin-
cipal point of debate in the deliberations of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and of the American Bar
Association on the Uniform Act. The latter organization, as has
been stated, recalled, at least formally, the position which it had
taken in approving and furthering the enactment of the United States
Act which embraces future-disputes agreements. Since the delib-
erations of these two organizations of lawyers involve apparently
the most extended consideration which has been given to this subject,
and because of the character of the membership of these organiza-
tions, the record of their deliberations will be summarized for the
following purposes: (1) to afford opportunity to evaluate the reasons
which were assigned for the inclusion and exclusion of future-dis-
putes agreements in arbitration statutes generally, and for the ex-
clusion of such agreements from the Uniform Act in particular; (2)
to indicate what is the significance of the dual position of the Ameri-
can Bar Association on the question. The origin of the Uniform
Act and the basis for its limited application in this important respect
will be thus best set forth.
At the annual meeting of the American Bar Association in 1920
it was voted that its Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commer-
cial Law should "consider and report at the next annual meeting . ..
upon the further extension of the principle of commercial arbitra-
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tion." The following year that committee reported drafts of a
Uniform State Act and of a United States Arbitration Act. The
latter, however, was reported as only a tentative draft; the committee
requested further time upon it. Concerning the State Act the com-
mittee reported as follows: "It has taken as the basis of its work as
to a uniform state arbitration act, the New Jersey Bill Assembly No.
412, which passed the House of New Jersey, but did not pass the
Senate of New Jersey. It was drawn by the New Jersey State
Chamber of Commerce and was modeled on the New York Law."
The American Bar Association voted to refer the Uniform State
Act so reported to the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.
At the meeting of the Association in 1922 its Committee on
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law reported a revised draft of
a United States Arbitration Act and a draft of a treaty for Commer-
cial Arbitration with foreign countries and recommended their ap-
proval. A revised draft of a Uniform State Act was also reported
with the committee's recommendation that it be referred to the
National Conference of Commissioners for its consideration. Each
of these pieces of proposed arbitration legislation embraced written
agreements to arbitrate"future as well as existing disputes and pro-
vided for their irrevocability, specific enforceability and the court-
appointment of arbitrators when necessary to carry out such agree-
ments. The recommendations of the committee were approved. The
committee's report concerning why it proposed legislation patterned
after the New York and New Jersey statutes follows:
"The testimony received by your committee at the public sessions
in New York, March 29, 30 and 31, 1922, confirms the testimony
received by the committee in 1921, namely, that there is great satis-
faction on the part of business men with principles and procedure of
the New York law and that it is desired that these principles should
be made effective in interstate commerce, intrastate commerce, and
freight commerce."
In this report the committee also emphasized that it was "highly
desirable that the federal statute and the uniform state statute should
dovetail and fit each with the other."
The committee concluded its report as follows:
"In the opinion of your committee, the adoption of the interna-
tional treaty, the federal statute and the uniform state statute will
put the United States in the forefront in this procedural reform. It
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will raise the standards of commercial ethics. It will reduce liti-
gation. It will enable business men to settle their disputes expedi-
tiously and economically, and will reduce the congestion in the
federal and state courts. In pressing forward this improvement in
the law, the Association will align itself with the best economic and
commercial thought of the country and will do much to overcome
the criticism of the law's delays."
At the meeting of the American Bar Association in 1923 its Com-
mittee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law again reported on
its extended activity in promoting the new arbitration legislation.
The bill for the United States Act "received the cordial support of
the National Association of Credit Men, as well as the New York
Chamber of Commerce, and was endorsed by the following among
other organizations" (giving long list of names of national and local
commercial associations), but the bill was not reported out of the
Committee on the Judiciary because it had been submitted too late in
the last session of Congress.
The committee also reported that it had learned that the Economic
Committee of the League of Nations had been engaged in drafting
articles of a protocol providing for international commercial arbitra-
tion, and that that committee was in accord with the Bar Association
Committee on Article 1 of its proposed treaty on commercial arbi-
tration in making irrevocable and enforceable written agreements to
arbitrate future as well as existing disputes.
It also cited the following resolution of the International Chamber
of Commerce adopted at its meeting in Rome in March, 1923:
"Full respect for the validity of arbitration clauses in a commer-
cial contract is an indispensable condition for the extension of the
practice of international commercial arbitration. One or more inter-
national conventions should be negotiated to pledge participating
countries to give effect to arbitration clauses and to cause its courts
to stay an action at law begun by a party to such a clause if the court
is satisfied the other party is willing to carry out the arbitration.
Through treaties, countries should provide that an award in a case
of commercial arbitration made in one country will be enforceable
in the other."
At the annual meeting of the American Bar Association in 1924
its Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law reported
upon its success in furthering the enactment of the United States
Act as follows:
"On January 29, 1924, the sub-committees of the Senate and
House Committee on the Judiciary held a joint hearing on the bills.
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At this hearing there were present the Chairman of your committee,
Julius Henry Cohen; a member of the committee, Francis B. James;
former Chairman of the Committee, Charles L. Bernheimer; Chair-
man of the Committee on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the
State of New York, representatives of the Brooklyn Chamber of
Commerce, Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, New Jersey.State
Chamber of Commerce, Massachusetts State Chamber of Commerce,
American Bankers' Association, Arbitration Society of America, and
representatives of many large trade organizations, all of whom spoke
in favor of the bills.
"On January 24, 1924, the House Committee on the Judiciary
made a favorable report on the House bill (Report No. 961), which
report is annexed to this report as Appendix A."
The United States Act was approved by the President on Feb-
ruary 12, 1925. 3
The foregoing Summary of the activities of the American Bar
Association and of its Committee on Commerce, Trade and Com-
mercial Law in furthering legislation to validate and make irrevocable
and specifically enforceable written agreements to arbitrate future as
well as existing disputes brings us to the annual meeting of the
Association in 1925 when the Uniform Act in the form in which it
has been submitted to the legislatures of the states by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was approved
by the Association.
The Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law rec-
ommended the following resolution:
"That the American Bar Association hereby makes due acknowl-
edgement to the commercial organizations throughout the United
States for their splendid cobperation in support of Senate Bill 1005,
enacted by the 68th Congress, which makes valid and enforceable
written provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes arising
out of contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce among the states
or territories or with foreign nations."
The outcome of this recommendation will be noticed later.
We may now turn to observe the progress of the Uniform State
Arbitration Act before the National Conference of Commissioners
143 Stat. 883 (1925), U. S. C. Lit. IX. Records of the proceedings of the
American Bar Association and of the reports of its Committee on Commerce,
Trade and Commercial Law, concerning the United States Arbitration Act, its
proposed Uniform States Arbitration Act and the Draft Treaty for Com-
mercial Arbitration appear in the following Reports of the Association:
Volumes XLV, XLVI, XLVII, XLVIII, XLIX and L. A valuable summary
is contained in the report of the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Com-
mercial Law in volume L, Reports, A. B. A. (1925) 84, 357.
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on Uniform State Laws which was referred to it for consideration
by the American Bar Association at its meeting in 1922.
The Conference appointed its first Committee on Arbitration at
its annual meeting in 1921. In 1923 a Second Tentative Draft of a
Uniform State Act was reported to the Conference by its Arbitra-
tion Committee. This draft followed the lines of the Uniform State
Act which was recommended by the American Bar Association; it
embraced written agreements to arbitrate future disputes as well as
existing controversies and provided that they should be irrevocable
and specifically enforceable. 4 The report of the Arbitration Com-
mittee follows:
"At the present time, there is on the statute books of the State
of New York an Arbitration Act that seems to be working out to the
satisfaction of the business men who have been willing to accept its
provisions in the drafting of their contracts and which has met with
the approval and the tests of the Court.
"Owing to the fact that a law of this kind would seem to come
most appropriately under the provisions of our Federal Laws, a
rather spirited and almost successful attempt was made to have Con-
gress pass on this subject. The Judiciary Committee reported out
a measure known as Senate Bill No. 4214, 67 Congress, 4th Session,
that had been carefully considered, but failed of passage owing to the
rush of business at the close of the session. Your Committee under-
stands that there are bright prospects for reporting the same bill out
in the coming Congress and, in all likelihood, it will receive Con-
gressional sanction.
"The State of New Jersey at the last session of its legislature
has also passed an Arbitration Act.
"Your committee taking full advantage of the proposed Federal
Act and the Act passed by the State of New Jersey which has re-
ceived the indorsement of the Commercial, Civic and Industrial
organizations of that State, followed both the provisions of the pro-
posed Federal Act and the New Jersey Act and report the same
herewith for your consideration."
At this meeting, however, the Conference, being in session as a
Committee of the Whole, reported out a different draft of a state
arbitration act for adoption by the Conference.5 This draft did not
embrace agreements to arbitrate future disputes. Section 1 of that
draft became Section 1 of the present Uniform Arbitration Act with-
out change. This draft, however, was referred to the Arbitration
'Handbook, Nat'l Conference of Corrs. on Uniform State Laws, 187
(1923). Consult also page 85 for remarks on this report by the President of
the Conference.
'Handbook, (1923) 193.
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Committee for further consideration. It was reported out again by
the Committee at the meeting of the Conference in 1924.6
A summary of the report of the deliberations of the Conference
upon Section 1 at its meeting in 1924 follows:
"Mr. Bailey (Mass.) raised the question whether the Conference
was to approve the New York and New Jersey idea of arbitration,
namely, that of allowing the parties to agree in advance to arbitrate
any future differences, or whether it was to approve the Illinois idea,
namely, that of allowing agreements to arbitrate only after disputes
had arisen.
"Mr. O'Connell (Mass.) stated that the committee had presented
the two conflicting ideas regarding arbitration to the Conference; that
it would be useless for the Conference to present an act which the
Bar Association would not support, that he did not believe the Bar
Association had committed itself to the New York and New Jersey
idea; * * * that the American Bar Association Committee on
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law has unanimously approved
the principle involved in the New York and New Jersey Acts; and
that in addition Mr. Cohen and Mr. Bernheimer had succeeded in
having the Senate Judiciary Committee at its last Congress approve
and report favorably the Federal Arbitration Act allowing agree-
ments to arbitrate in advance of disputes.7
"The bill did not pass and in the present Congress was not acted
upon by the Senate or the House.
"Mr. Bailey (Mass.): I was told this morning that it had unani-
mously passed the House about two weeks ago Friday night, before
adjournment.
"Mr. O'C6nnell (Mass.): Well, of course, there has been no real
discussion of the subject as yet. The Senate Judiciary Committee
has simply accepted the attitude of New York and New Jersey.
Now then, we have taken the matter up, and at the last session we
held in Minneapolis the subjest was, at a very largely attended meet-
ing, rather thoroughly discussed, and this committee which reported
out last year the law based on the New Jersey and the New York
Acts, was overturned, and the Conference decided that we would not
follow New York and New Jersey, and as I gathered from the tem-
per of the meeting and the remarks expressed and from the consider-
ation which the committee has since given to it, it is felt by our
Commissioners that it will be utterly impossible to secure the passage
of a law that will take away from the courts the matter of deciding
controversies by agreeing in advance to do so, and it is because we
feel that it would be idle to recommend such a law that we are recom-
'Handbook, (1924) 638-645.
'Mr. O'Connell appears to have been the Chairman of the Committee on
Arbitration of the Conference. He and his committee reported to the Con-
ference in 1923 as is set forth, supra, page 368. See also Report of the Com-
mittee in 1925; Handbook, page 757 (1925).
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mending a law which we feel will be accepted in the greatest number
of the states of the Union, and so addressing ourselves to that prob-
lem of how we can find the best Arbitration Act we met in Chicago
and we discussed with the Chamber of Commerce in Chicago, which
is probably just as influential a body as the New York Chamber of
Commerce-certainly having interests just as large-we discussed
with their representatives the working and the manner in which the
Arbitration Act of the Middle West, as represented in the Illinois
Act, was being received by the merchants of that part of the world.
It seemed to be the unanimous opinion of the merchants in Chicago
that they would prefer to have the law as it is in the Illinois Act.
There seemed to be no desire, not a single man appeared before us
who asked that the law be changed. They felt that the farmers and
the business men and the traders of that great Mississippi Valley
would never give up their rights to go to the courts, not knowing in
advance what those rights were. Now that seems to be the crux, and
I call the attention of you gentlemen here to the fact that we are not
only trying to get a uniform law but we are really legislating, and
we have got to bear in mind what these legislators will do; we have
got to bear in mind what the people want. Under the New York
Act you are called upon8 to agree in advance through a clause that
is in the contract, most often in small type, that all controversies of
any nature, kind or description are to be taken out of the courts and
are to be submitted to an arbitrator, either named then or to be
named later. It is felt by the great majority of the committee that
this is wrong in principle, to call upon men to agree in advance to
arbitrate any difficulties that might arise, particularly in view of the
fact that that would be done in most instances without any real-
ization on the part of the contracting parties as to what they were
really doing. Of course, we all agree that men ought to know what
they are doing when they are signing contracts, but we all know
from a practical experience that the fine type of contracts, whilst
entirely binding, is seldom read, and we do feel that it is a giving up
of rights that the American people really regard as sacred and they
shouldn't be called upon to do so.
"Mr. Bailey (Mass.): Mr. Chairman, is the Chairman of the
committee aware that this is not simply a local issue or a matter con-
sidered in New York, New Jersey and Illinois and the United States,
but by the commercial interest of Europe and South America, as well
as over here? I happen to be a member of the committee of the
International Law Association where this matter is being discussed,
and as I understand it, the Chambers of Commerce in London, Eng-
land, France and elsewhere are in favor of following the New York
It should not be overlooked that the statutes which embrace future-disputes
clauses as well as agreements to arbitrate existing controversies are predicated
upon a written agreement of the parties. They do not "compel" arbitration in
absence of such agreement.
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and the New Jersey doctrine, and that the New York law was framed
in harmony with the English and the French mode of procedure.
"Mr. Miller (Ia.) stated that, in his opinion, it was not practical
to approve an Arbitration Act which allowed agreements in advance
to arbitrate future disputes, since many courts had held such an
agreement invalid and Commissioners from a large number of states
had disapproved such an idea. He felt sure that an act involving
New York and New Jersey principles would never receive general
adoption.
"Mr. Piatt (Mo.): This is not a commercial arbitration act. This
act is an act perfectly clear, by the first section and also by the title,
to arbitrate, as Chairman O'Connell well says, a controversy that has
already arisen. In other words, by this act you are going to permit
a man to settle his difficulty without going into court. . . . I
take it that's the inherent right of all disputants.
"The other act has to deal with commercial matters and it is pat-
terned after the commercial act of New York and New Jersey, and
I simply want to call your attention to this particular phase of it,
gentlemen. By the Commercial Arbitration Act agreeing in advance
to submit controversies, arising under a contract into which you have
entered, to arbitrators, if you do have a dispute you have put it in
the power of the parties to compel the performance of the contract.
In other words, you have put it into the power of commercialism
today to make commercialism of today honest. .. .
"President MacChesney [President of the Conference] : I v/ould
like to discuss for just a moment some of the questions raised by the
Commissioner from Missouri. He states that this is not an. arbitra-
tion act at all but cover all matters of controversy. I take it that it
does cover all matters of controversy but it is not for that reason
any less a commercial arbitration act, and I can't go with the Com-
missioner from Missouri when he says that the kind of contract
contemplated by the New York and New Jersey Act makes for mor-
ality. On the contrary, similar provisions, it has been generally felt,
in contracts are very unfair and are known generally as jug-handled
contracts. You take this question of agreeing to submit in advance-
that is usually printed in a contract-and the little merchant who
buys from the big manufacturer or wholesaler knows nothing about
it and only wakes up to find that he signed a contract to give his
rights away. . . . It is rather significant that the talk about the
demand for arbitration in this country along the line suggested by the
committee of the American Bar Association is limited to New York
and New Jersey. I call attention to the fact that there are forty-
eight states in this Union, and that the rule in practically forty-six
of them is along the lines of the report of this committee, and in the
Chicago Association of Commerce, which has a great arbitration de-
partment organized and which does business from the Alleghanies
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on the East to the Rockies on the West and to the Canadian lines and
Gulf of Mexico, they feel very fearful of any such proposition as is
laid down in the New York and New Jersey Acts. I think the com-
mittee has struck at the difference in opinion commented on by the
Commissioner from Massachusetts, that is, that it has in New York
and New Jersey the aspect of foreign trade, and between people of
different countries there is some demand for that sort of thing and
in that case it may be very fair that that should be true, so that the
New York situation is not at all parallel, because where the importers
or the exporters are doing business with each other they are doing
business on a parity; but I want to say that the Chicago Association
of Commerce, which is the largest commercial association in America,
doing business in more states than any other commercial association
and with a membership of more than double the New York Asso-
ciation, feel extremely fearful of any such rule. They say that in
their judgment, it will absolutely destroy the principle of arbitration
in this country, and why? Because if you pass a law such as is
advocated by the gentleman who believes a man should waive his
rights by contract in advance, and the country merchant goes into
the city of Chicago, for instance, and does business with our great
manufacturing or wholesale establishments there and he waives his
rights and he gets what he feels is an unfair deal in the arbitration,
and doesn't have a'right to have it reviewed by the courts, he is
going to feel that he has been badly used and robbed of his rights
under the law, even though it may appear legal under the law, and
the result will be, our people feel, that the country merchants will
not agree to any arbitration contract, so that instead of submitting
to arbitration any controversies which shall arise thereafter they will
refuse to submit to arbitration at all, saying they will stand on their
legal rights, and it is the judgment of the men who have given as
long attention and as continuous attention and have as large an ex-
perience in it as any group of men in this country, represented by
this arbitration board of the Chicago Association of Commerce, that
to attempt to put such a thing in would practically destroy the work
they have done for ten years in educating the public in favor of arbi-
tration. In other words, they feel that men are not able to deal on a
parity as they are in New York-and I hope you gentlemen will keep
that in mind, as would he the importer and exporter; men are not
able to deal on a parity, but the real difficulty is that between a large
manufacturer or wholesaler in a city like Chicago or St. Louis and
the small country merchant it is not fair to insert in a contract a
provision by which the small merchant waives in advance his legal
rights without knowing what they may be; and so, speaking for the
group represented there and because the other Commissioners are
not here from Illinois, I desire to urge upon the Commissioners the
very great necessity of giving due weight to the fact that only two
states in this Union have adopted this rule advocated by the corn-
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mittee of the American Bar Association and that forty-six states of
the Union have chosen to follow the rule which protects primarily
their own people doing business within their borders.
"I don't think it is a question of morality. I don't like to think
that I am going to yield to the importers of New York and New
Jersey anything in the line of morality. I think this Conference of
members of forty-eight states and some of the Territories have just
as high ideals, so far as morality and law is concerned, as the gentle-
man in the New York Chamber of Commerce, and I am afraid that
when he and his committee met in New York and listened to the
blandishments of those importers talking morality, that they forgot
the morality that prevailed on the plains and in the mountains away
from New York City. I am afraid that this New York Act, when
you come right down to it, gentlemen, is a species of special legis-
lation for a certain group and a small group in just one section of
the country that would be profited most by it . ..
"Mr. Piatt (Mo.): I apologize to the Chairman of the Committee
and to the Chairman of this section who may have understood my
remarks as being either an appeal to emotionalism or sectionalism.
I don't live in New York; I only come to New York, and I have
only come to New York a few times, and when I come it is at my
own expense, and I don't know what New York wants in that par-
ticular sense. I do know, it is a matter of common knowledge, that
architect's contracts, building contracts and boards of trade, nearly
all of them, have in them agreements to arbitrate, and in my simple
western way I don't know why the little merchant out in rural Mis-
souri shouldn't observe his contract with the St. Louis manufacturer,
if he makes one, why he shouldn't be required to carry it out to the
crossing of the 't' and the dotting of the 'i,' or vice versa, but I didn't
rise here to get into a controversy with anybody in this section over
matters pending before a committee of which I happen to be Chair-
man, and, as I say, I regret having arisen because of my connection
with that committee and putting the matter in this embarrassing
shape, and I ask that I be allowed to withdraw my remarks from the
record.
"Mr. Washington (Tenn.): . . . The point reached by the
gentlemen and by the legislatures of New Jersey and New York
seems to me to be quite far-reaching. It should include any kind of
an agreement looking to the future. It would include or might in-
clude, perhaps, two enterprising farmers who have bought large
plantations adjoining each other, and they would meet and say, 'We
have bought these farms in juxta-position; we don't know what con-
troversies may arise between us, but having so located here and
settled here let us enter into an agreement to submit to arbitration
anything on earth that may occur between us touching these enter-
prises.' It seems to me that a thing like that could be quite far-
reaching. You would have no means of knowing where it would
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end. Arbitration is too summary to relegate important controversies
before they have arisen." 9
Following this discussion the Conference voted to adopt Section
1 of the present Uniform Act and thereafter voted the remainder of
the present act section by section.
At the annual meeting of the American Bar Association in 1925
Mr. MacChesney, President of the Conference, submitted the Uni-
form Arbitration Act as approved and recommended by the Confer-
ence, for the approval of the Association.
In submitting his recommendation Mr. MacChesney reiterated
the propositions which had been advanced chiefly by himself and
Commissioner O'Connell at the meeting of the Conference of Com-
missioners in 1924 as reported above.' 0
The American Bar Association voted 175 in favor and 26 against
approving the Act."
The proposed resolution of thanks to the commercial organiza-
tions who had aided the Association in procuring the enactment of
the United States Arbitration Act was voted "upon the understand-
ing that the thanking of these gentlemen for this assistance, is not to
be regarded in any way as an indorsement of the position taken in
that bill in the light of the vote just taken.' 2
In short, this change of position by the American Bar Asso-
ciation was accomplished after less than two hours discussion of
the matter in open forum notwithstanding it bad been committed to
and had held to a different position since its annual meeting in 1921.
This deliberation upon the matter, however, was described as "one
of the most momentous debates that this Association has ever had
presented to it" by a member who declared that he had attended
almost every session of the Association since 1884.
This small quorum would seem to merit all of the criticism which
it has received in approving the Uniform Act and repudiating the
United States Act as it did. Customary courtesy to one of its com-
mittees by an Association so completely dependent upon its several
committees for any substantial service would seem to have induced a
different result. Strains of petty sectional prejudice and of pro-
'Handbook, (1924) 60-73.
" L, Reports, A. B. A., 135-138 (1925).
' L, Reports, A. B. A., 162 (1925). The membership of the Association was
reported to be 23,450 by the Committee on Membership. Reports 465 (1925).
Members registered at this meeting were 1839. Reports 182 (1925).
' Reports, A. B. A., 162 (1925).
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vincialism, if not also of personal animus, sounded every now and
then by Messrs. MacChesney and O'Connell, might well have made
this group solicitous to preserve the record which the Association had
made in furthering arbitration legislation.
When the act was voted upon in the Conference of Commissioners
the Commissioners of the following jurisdictions voted against it:
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
and Porto Rico. Commissioners of twenty-three states voted in
favor of the act as follows: Alabama, California, District of Colum-
bia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont and
Wyoming.13
Arbitration statutes have been long standing in nearly all of the
states. While those early statutes vary in many particulars they are
alike in the respect that they do not expressly embrace future-disputes
agreements.14 In 1923 Wisconsin copied the New York Law except-
ing only those sections of the New York Law which deal with written
agreements to arbitrate future disputes.
In Colorado and Washington the supreme court of each state has
held that a future-disputes clause in a written contract is valid and
irrevocable in the following particulars: (1) that the arbitration
agreement can be pleaded to defeat an action in court upon a cause
subject to the arbitration agreement; (2) that neither party can
terminate the powers of arbitrators once appointed by giving notice
of revocation.' 5 These courts appear to take the position that the
legislatures have approved of arbitration as a method of adjusting
controversies by enacting their arbitration statutes and although these
statutes do not expressly embrace future-disputes agreements these
courts find no reason why parties should not be allowed to contract
in advance for that remedy.
The English Arbitration Act (1889), embraces written future-
disputes clauses as well as agreements to arbitrate existing contro-
versies.' 6
Concerning the Draft Treaty on Commercial Arbitration, ap-
"Handbook, Nat'l. Conference of the Comrs. on Uniform State Laws 163(1924).
"'Year Book on Commercial Arbitration pp. 1007-1100. Annex I (1927).
"'Ezell v. Rocky Mountain etc., Co., 76 Colo. 409 (1925); State ex rel.
Fancher v. Everett, 144 Wash. 592, 258 Pac. 286 (1927).1652 and 53 Vict., c., 49, section 27 (1889).
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proved by the American Bar Association in 1922 and the work of
the Economic Committee of the League of Nations, mentioned in the
report of the Bar Association Committee on Commerce, Trade and
Commercial Law for 1923, it may be noted that the fourth Assembly
of the League of Nations submitted the following Protocol on Arbi-
tration clauses for adoption by the member nations on September
24,1923:
"Each of the Contracting States recognizes the validity of an
agreement whether relating to existing or future differences between
parties subject respectively to the jurisdiction of different Contracting
States by which the parties to a contract agree to submit to arbitration
all or any differences that may arise in connection with such contract
relating to commercial matters or to any other matters capable of
settlement by arbitration, whether or not the arbitration is to take
place in a country to whose jurisdiction none of the parties is
subject."' 7
In Report No. 7 of the International Chamber of Commerce it is
stated that "a written agreement to submit future differences to
arbitration is valid and irrevocable" in the following countries of
the world: Africa (South)-The Cape, Natal, Transvaal (Orange
Free States excluded), Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Greece-if submitted to the arbitration of a Greek Chamber
of Commerce, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sudan, Sweden and Switzerland. In
Costa Rica, Cuba and Guatemala if special forms are used. In
Brazil such agreements are reported as "not valid . . . and al-
ways revocable.' 8
The almost unanimous view of American judges, as set forth
in their reported opinions, is one of regret for the common law rules
of revocability and non-enforceability specifically of agreements to
arbitrate future and existing disputes.' 9
As a result of this exclusion of agreements to arbitrate future
"
TVolume 5, League of Nations-Official Journal 235, 236 (1924). See also
Volume 7-Official Journal 568 and 1359 (1926), for progress in ratification of
this Protocol.
'Reprinted in Year Book on Commercial Arbitration pp. 1113-1142, Annex
IV. (1927).
" See the classic opinions of Hough, J., in United States Asphalt Refining
Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., Limited, 222 Fed. 1006 (D. C. S. D. N.
Y.) (1915), and of Cardozo, J., in Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberq,
230 N. Y. 261, 130 N. E. 288 (1921). See also an editorial, Opinions on Arbi-
tration Clash, volume 9 Journal of the American Judicature Society 76 (1925).
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disputes and other departures in the Uniform Arbitration Act a sub-
stitute Uniform State Act has been drafted by the American Arbi-
tration Association and submitted to the several state legislatures for
adoption. This draft act follows the lines of the New York and
Federal Arbitration Statutes. It was adopted with some changes in
California and Pennsylvania in 1927. It is endorsed by such national
organizations as the American Bankers Association, American So-
ciety of Certified Public Accountants, Motion Picture Producers and
Distributors of America and the National Association of Credit
Men 20
Cases at Common Law.
The supreme court of North Carolina has had few cases involv-
ing the legal position of a future-disputes clause. It has held, how-
ever, that such a clause is revocable in the sense that it cannot be
pleaded to defeat an action brought upon a cause embraced within
its terms.21 The court has also generalized as follows: "It has been
generally held that an agreement in an executory contract to submit
a dispute which arises thereunder to an arbitration, the effect of
which is to 'oust the courts of their jurisdiction,' is against public
policy."2 2  It has intimated, however, that the aggrieved party is
entitled to damages for breach of such future-disputes agreements. 23
Concerning the position of such agreements in courts of equity,
it may be noted that the court has quoted with approval general
statements to the effect that specific performance will be denied.2 4
In Ellington & Guy Inc. v. Currie,25 however, where the party who
Concerning the use of future-disputes clauses by American business organ-
izations, see Year Book on Commercial Arbitration (1927) ; by English busi-
ness organizations, see, Rosenbaum, A Report on Commercial Arbitration in
England, American Judicature Society, Bulletin XII (1916).
Williams & Bro. v. Branning Mfg. Co., 154 N. C. 205, 70 S. E. 290 (1911).
The clause was contained in a contract for the operation of a saw mill and
provided for arbitration "in the event of any future misunderstanding or dis-
agreement between the parties hereto as to the contract of 1 March 1901, or as
to any modifications of the same herein contained . . . "-s.c. 153 N. C. 7, 69
S. E. 10 (1910).
'Ellington & Guy Inc. v. Currie, 193 N. C. 610, 137 S. E. 869 (1927). In
Williams & Bro. v. Branning Mfg. Co., 154 N. C. 205, 70 S. E. 290, the propo-
sition is stated as follows: "It has generally been held that an agreement to
arbitrate controversies which may arise in the course of executing a contract
is void, as its effect is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts." Compare the
general attitude expressed by the court in Nelson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
157 N. C. 194, 198, 72 S. E. 998 (1911).
W illiams & Bro. v. Branning Mfg. Co., 154 N. C. 205, 70 S. E. 290
(1911).
' Williams & Bro. v. Branning Mfg. Co., supra, note 21.
" Supra, note 22.
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applied for the appointment of a receiver was in default under an
arbitration clause, the court remarked that "in a court of equity,
seeking to do justice, in an application for a receiver, a provisional
remedy, the breaking of this solemn agreement will be considered as
strong circumstance, with the other evidence, as to the right of the
party who breached the agreement to have a receiver appointed."
If an arbitration has been had and an award has been duly ren-
dered under a future-disputes clause, it is inferred that the court
will hold that it is conclusive20 and enforceable as in case of other
awards, and this is true although the clause embraces the "entire
controversy." Thus, the court has quoted, apparently with approval,
the following general proposition: "that although an agreement to
arbitrate the entire controversy is not enforceable, and that prior to
the award either party may revoke the agreement, that if he fails to
do so, and enters upon the arbitration, and an award is made, he is
bound." 2 7  There should be no difficulty in arriving at this result
where the party who contests the award had participated in the hear-
ing until the award was rendered.28 If the agreement to arbitrate
embraces only one or more questions of fact it is clear that an award
cannot be contested because it was rendered in an arbitration which
was held pursuant to a future-disputes agreement. 29
FUTURE-EiISPUTES CLAUSES CLASSIFIE--"APPRAISALS,"
"VALUATIONS"
A general distinction between future-disputes agreements to sub-
mit "the whole controversy" or "the right of action," and those
which are limited to one or more "questions of fact" recurs in the
opinions of the supreme court.30 Clauses of the latter class are
declared to be irrevocable, at least in the particular that they can be
I This term refers to the following propositions: (1) that the award is rcs
adjudicata on the merits of the controversy submitted so that a party thereto
cannot try them again by bringing an action in court; (2) that the award is
res adjudicata on the merits of the controversy so that a party thereto cannot
put them in issue when the award is sought to be enforced against him.
'Nelson. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998 (1911);
Williams & Bro. v. Branning Mfg. Co., 154 N. C. 205, 70 S. E. 290 (1911).
Consult and compare Kelly v. Trimont Lodge, 154 N. C. 97, 69 S. W. 764(1910). See also Greene v. Bechtel, 193 N. C. 94, 136 S. E. 94 (1927).
"See N. P. Sloan. Co. v. Standard Chemical & Oil Co., 256 Fed. 451 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1918) ; Penn. Plate Glass Co. v. Insurance Co., 189 Pa. 255, 42 Atd. 138
(1899).
'Herndon v. Insurance Co., 107 N. C. 183, 12 S. E. 126 (1890)-award
under appraisal clause in fire insurance policy.
"'See, supra, notes 27 and 29.
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pleaded to defeat an action brought upon a cause embraced in the
agreement. Whether these clauses are irrevocable in the sense that
the powers of the arbitrators can not be terminated by notice prior to
award rendered has not been expressly decided. It should also be
noted that the irrevocability of such clauses in the particular indi-
cated does not determine that they are specifically enforceable, nor
that a court will appoint arbitrators when a party refuses to do so or
in case of other emergency. These questions remain for future
decisions.31
Appraisal Clauses in Fire Insurance Policies
The consideration of future-disputes agreements which embrace
"only questions of fact" has been most extensive in connection with
appraisal clauses in fire insurance policies. The court concisely stated
its position concerning these clauses in Braddy v. New York, etc.,
Insurance Co. 32 as follows:
"While it is well settled that an agreement in a policy of insur-
ance to submit to arbitration the single question of the amount of
loss by fire sustained by the person insured is valid . . . it is
equally well understood that a contract which would oust the juris-
diction of the courts by leaving all of the matter involved in any
controversy that might arise between insurer and insured to such
arbitrament is void as against public policy."
In the first case of this group which came before the supreme
court,33 the insured brought an action to recover on a policy which
contained a clause that the adjustment of a "difference . . . as
to the amount of loss or damage . . . shall, at the written re-
quest of either party, be submitted to two competent and impartial
persons . . . but (they) shall not decide the liability of the
company." The policy also provided that no action at law or in
equity should be brought upon the policy until such appraisal and
award were had. In this action the defendant company pleaded a
denial of any liability on the ground that it had made a written
request on the plaintiff to arbitrate their difference and that plaintiff
1 Concerning the position of such clauses under the new arbitration statutes
which embrace agreements to settle by arbitration disputes which may arise in
the future see, Sturges, Arbitration Under the New Pennsylvania Arbitration
Statute, 76 University of Pa. Law Review, 345, 357, 387 (1928).
115 N. C. 354, 20 S. E. 477 (1894). See also Pioneer Mfg. Co. v. 1hoenix
Assurance Co., 106 N. C. 28, 10 S. E. 1057 (1890) and Nelson v. Atlantic Coast
Line Co., supra, note 27.
Pioneer Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 106 N. C. 28, 10 S. E. 1057
(1890).
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refused. The irrevocability of the agreement was sustained against
the argument that as a future-disputes clause it was against public
policy. The court declared that it did not offend public policy "in so
far as it provides for the submission to arbitration of the amount of
loss or damage sustained by the assured." The court also rejected
the argument that the clause was inoperative against the plaintiff
since it did not contemplate the determination of the legal responsi-
bility of the company.
It was also resolved in this first case that it was incumbent upon
the defendant who relied upon the written request for arbitration
and the refusal by the plaintiff, to show that a "difference" had
arisen between the parties which was within the scope of the ap-
praisal clause. It was held that the defendant had sustained this
burden by showing that its adjuster had offered the plaintiff a certain
sum of money for the damage and loss covered by the policy and
that plaintiff refused to accept it.
"Waiver" of appraisal clauses. While these appraisal clauses are
irrevocable in the sense that they can be pleaded to defeat an action
on the policy it is clear from the decision in Higson v. North River
Insurance Co.3 4 that such a clause may be rendered inoperative in
this respect in a particular case by reason of the conduct of the
insurer. Thus where the defendant company in that case denied
any liability on the policy after loss on the ground that the husband
of the insured burned the property covered by the policy to procure
the insurance money, it was held that this denial of liability waived
any conditions in the policy relating to proof of loss or ascertainment
of the amount of loss. On the other hand, in the first case before the
court, Pioneer Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co.,35 discussed above,
it is settled that an announcement of a refusal to pay anything on the
policy, made in consequence of the plaintiff's refusal to comply with
the written request of the defendant company for an arbitration pur-
suant to the appraisal clause, is not such a "waiver."
The supreme court has made a general declaration of principle
concerning the conduct of both parties with respect to the arbitration
as follows:
"If either party acts in bad faith in order to defeat the real object
of the arbitration, the other is absolved from duty in regard to it, and
from any obligation to enter into a new agreement for arbitration."
"152 N. C. 206, 67 S. E. 509 (1910).
"106 N. C. 28, 10 S. E. 1057 (1890).
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This generalization was applied in the case of Braddy v. New York
etc., Insurance Co.86 Each party appointed an appraiser; defendant's
appointee proposed a certain person as umpire; plaintiff's appointee
objected because that person had already been nominated by another
insurance company which was liable on the same loss. The two
appointees then agreed that each would name three other persons
and that they would choose one from the six. Defendant's appointee
named three persons outside the state. Plaintiff's appointee objected
for the reason, the court expressly assumed, that they were unknown
to him. The umpire was never appointed and the appraisal was not
had and the insured brought an action to recover on the policy. The
defendant pleaded the arbitration clause. The court allowed the
plaintiff's action. It said:
"We do not think it unreasonable for an appraiser, acting with a
view to secure the services of an unprejudiced, competent and honest
associate, to insist that only the names of persons living in the vicin-
age, or in the state, or in some way known to him, at least by repu-
tation, should be tendered to him to take the place and discharge the
functions of a juror. The failure of the arbitration was evidently
due to the unreasonable conduct of the appraiser selected by the
defendants, and they had notice of all that was done by him. It is
not necessary for us to follow the ruling of the Court of Pennsyl-
vania in holding that, in any failure of arbitrators selected to agree,
the plaintiff is left at liberty to sue, though good reasons could be
given for so doing. But in this particular case . . . it is mani-
fest that if the company did not intend or consent, by dilatory meas-
ures, to defeat the bringing of an action, the success of the stratagem
adopted by Westbrook [defendant's appointee] might point out the
way for an unscrupulous agent in the future designedly to accom-
plish what the law would declare unlawful if it were attempted by
the means of the enforcement of the contract."
The following year, in Pretzfelder v. Merchants Insurance Co.,a7
the supreme court went the full way of the Pennsylvania court and
held as follows:
"We think the proper rule is laid down in Ins. Co. v. Hocking,
115 Pa., 416, that where the arbitrators, or a majority of them fall
to agree upon an award, the plaintiff (unless he is shown to have
acted in bad faith in selecting his arbitrator) is not compelled to
submit to another arbitration and another delay, but may forthwith
bring his actiohi in court."
-115 N. C. 354, 20 S. E. 477 (1894).
1116 N. C. 491, 21 S. E. 302 (1893); s. c. 123 N. C. 164, 31 S. E. 470(1895).
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Apparently it is safe to summarize as follows: that, upon demand
by the company for an appraisal to be had in accordance with the
appraisal clause, the insured must act as follows: (1) perform once,
but only once, to the extent of appointing such appraiser or appraisers
as he has agreed to appoint; (2) he shall not knowingly choose such
person for an appraiser as will seek to defeat the arbitration; (3) the
insured must not interfere with the appointees and their proceedings
so as to prevent the appraisal and award-their failure to conduct the
appraisal and to render an award must be "without his fault."
APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE-GENERAL
(a) Time of Taking Effect
By Section 26 it is provided that "this act shall be in force and
effect from and after its ratification." It was ratified on March 4,
1927.
(b) Relation of the Statute to Common Law Arbitrations
The statute contains no express repeal of the common law rules
governing arbitration agreements and arbitrations and awards had
thereunder. It does not appear to imply the exclusion of common
law arbitrations. As has already been pointed out Section 1 does
not embrace future-disputes agreements. It is clear that common
law rules governing such agreements are left intact. The same ob-
servations may be made with respect to oral agreements to arbitrate
existing controversies. With respect to 'written agreements to arbi-
trate existing controversies Section 1 of the act raises some questions
in this connection. It provides as follows: "That two or more parties
may agree in writing to submit to arbitration, in conformity with the
provisions of this act, any controversy existing between them at the
time of the agreement to submit. . . " (Italics are the writer's.)
Is it to be understood that a written agreement to arbitrate an exist-
ing controversy which is not "in conformity with the provisions of
this act" is to be governed by common law rules? An affirmative
answer seems plausible. In other words, only such written agree-
ments to arbitrate existing controversies as are "in conformity with
the provisions of this act" are embraced in the act. However, if this
is true, then the question arises how do parties to a written agree-
ment to arbitrate an existing controversy invoke the act? This ques-
tion arises because the act prescribes no special formal requisites to
qualify such an agreement under the act rather than under common
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law rules. 38  That is, a written agreement to arbitrate an existing
controversy may, so far as formal requisites are concerned, qualify
as a common law arbitration agreement and as one "in conformity
with the provisions of this act." If all common law rules affecting
written agreements to arbitrate an existing controversy are not ex-
cluded by reason of the universal application of the new statute to
such agreements, it remains for the supreme court to determine that
the parties to such an agreement bring it under the statute unless
they indicate that a common law arbitration agreement is intended,
or, to determine that common law rules shall apply unless the parties
clearly invoke the statute. In view of the possibility of these alter-
nate holdings it may be noted that Section 1 lends itself to at least
the following proposition: That unless the parties stipulate in their
written agreement that they are to arbitrate in compliance with the
provisions of the act, their agreement and proceedings thereunder
may be subject to common law rules only.
Another question presents itself in connection with the general
topic at hand. If all common law rules governing agreements, written
and oral, to arbitrate future and existing controversies are not re-
pealed by the new statute, are common law rules exclusively appli-
cable to the arbitral proceedings and awards rendered therein which
are had under such agreements as are not governed by the statute?
In other words, are any parts of the statute to be regarded as gen-
eral regulatory provisions governing alike common law and statu-
tory arbitration agreements and the arbitral proceedings and awards?
After reviewing the act in its entirety it seems scarcely plausible to
construe it as a series of statutory provisions for the regulation of
arbitrations generally. It purports to apply to and to regulate agree-
ments, proceedings and awards had in compliance with its terms, and,
by implication, it would seem, to those only.3 9
(c) Relation of the Statute to Prior Legislation Concerning Arbi-
tration
Section 25 of the act provides that "all laws and clauses of laws
in conflict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed."
, Section 2 of the act prescribes that "the arbitration agreement must state
the question or questions in controversy with sufficient definiteness to present
one or more issues or questions upon which an award may be based," but it is
not clear that compliance with this section will give any distinctive appearance
to the agreement.
" This conclusion does not deny that one or more of the sections of the act
may be a codification of one or more common law rules.
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North Carolina appears not to have had any prior arbitration
statute of general application. Sections 572-579 of the Consolidated
Statutes, however, provide for, and regulate in some detail, references
of pending actions with the written consent of the parties, and, in
certain cases, without the consent of the parties, as in a case of com-
plicated accounts.
It seems quite clear that the new act which requires a written
agreement to arbitrate is not applicable to those provisions of the
prior statutes which deal with compulsory references. By reason of
its non-applicability it does not repeal the prior statutory provisions.
In case of a reference by consent of parties by written agreement
does the new act apply? If it is held to apply it is possible that it
will be held to exclude the provisions of the prior law, because of
"conflict," at least "difference," in several provisions. The writer
will presume to do no more than state the case: Will the new act
be held to exclude the old statute merely because there is a written
agreement to arbitrate an existing dispute, or will it apply only if it
is clearly invoked by the parties-only if they agree in writing that
they are to arbitrate under the new act? It may be again noted that
Section 1 provides that "two or more parties may agree in writing to
submit to arbitration, in conformity with the provisions of this act,
." (Italics are the writer's.) It does not purport to be all
inclusive of written agreements to arbitrate existing controversies.
Another statute in North Carolina provides that corporations,
partnerships and individuals engaging as common carriers who be-
come involved in a controversy with each other "may agree in writing
to submit such controversy to the [corporation] commission as arbi-
trator. . .,4o It would seem plausible to argue that the new act
was not necessarily intended to exclude or repeal this prior statute
which deals with written agreements to arbitrate these special con-
troversies between this particular group of parties before the arbi-
trators specified by the statute and that where such parties agree in
writing to submit a controversy to the Corporation Commission as
arbitrators that it should be held that the parties thereby invoked the
older statute unless they more clearly indicate an appeal to the new
act.4 1
"Consolidated Statutes, Section 1059.
41 Similar conclusion would seem plausible concerning the statutory provision
quoted, infra, note 46.
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PERSONS COMPETENT TO CONTRACT TO ARBITRATE
(a) Provisions of the Statute.
Section 1 provides that "two or more parties" may enter into an
agreement in writing to submit an existing controversy. It provides
also that such an agreement shall be valid and enforceable, and that
"neither party shall have the power to revoke the submission without
the consent of the other party or parties to the submission save upon
such grounds as exist in law or equity for the rescission or revocation
of any contract." While the term "two or more parties" is compre-
hensive, it seems clear by reason of the saving clause, if not other-
wise, that the legal power of certain classes of persons to enter into
such contracts can be put in issue as in case of other contracts.
Reference is made to the special position of married women (at least
at common law), minors and corporations, and to the representative
position of agents, fiduciaries, partners and personal representatives.
If a party to a written agreement to arbitrate an existing con-
troversy which invokes the statute can, in a given case, "avoid" it
on his own account or for want of power of his representative to act
for him questions of mutuality are certain to arise. Must one party
perform an executory submission agreement notwithstanding it is a
matter of pleasure with the other party whether he will perform?
Can the former party contest an adverse award on the ground that
he has ascertained since the award that the successful party could
have avoided the arbitration agreement or the award if it had gone
against him? Will the person who has cause to avoid the agreement
"waive" the cause "to avoid" or "ratify" the agreement by partici-
pating in the arbitration with knowledge of the cause "to avoid"?
The writer will not presume to attempt an answer to these and
similar questions which will inevitably arise in this connection under
the act.42
(b) Cases at Common Law.
Few cases have come before the supreme court which seem im-
portant for their effect upon common law arbitration or as a back-
ground of the statute for the question at hand.
Minors. In the case of Millsaps v. Estes,43 which involved the
"2See Sturges, Arbitration Under the New Pennsylvania Arbitration
Statute, 76 University of Pa. Law Review 345, 388 (1928). See expressions
concerning "Mutuality" by the Supreme Court in Barretts v. Patterson, 1 N. C.
126 (1799).
" 137 N. C. 535, 50 S. E. 227 (1905), s.c. 134 N. C. 486, 46 S. E. 988 (1904).
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reference of a pending action under a rule of court and consent of
the parties, the supreme court declared generally on the first appeal
that the award and judgment entered thereon were void as to the
minors, who were the plaintiffs in the action. The court said: "...
an infant cannot give his consent to a submission of his cause to arbi-
tration, and any attempt to do so for him is absolutely void." On the
second appeal of the case, however, the court concluded that it was
not required to decide whether the award and judgment were void or
only vdidable for they were not conclusive or enforceable on other
grounds.
On the second appeal of the Millsaps case the court also made the
following statement: "Nor has a guardian ad litem or next friend
the power to submit for the infant, even though the submission be a
rule of court." It is inferable that the court meant that such guardian
did not have the power to submit for the minor so that an award
thereunder would be unavoidably obligatory or conclusive against the
minor. 4
Attorney-at-Law. It is settled that an attorney has the power to
submit his client's cause in a pending action. That the client is not
consulted and did not know of 'the submission is not material for
"arbitration is one of the legal modes of trying disputed questions to
which the client's cause may be submitted by the attorney under his
general authority to prosecute or defend."'45
According to the Millsaps case, however, the reference by an at-
torney and the award thereunder are at least voidable by the client
where the client is a minor.
Personal Representatives. Although there is no express decision
in point it is inferred from the cases cited ift the note that the
personal representative of a deceased person has power by virtue of
his office to submit claims affecting the estate to arbitration whether
or not the claim is in a pending action. 6
"But consult Ryan v. Blount et al Exrs., 16 N. C. 382 (1820).
"Morris v. Grier 76 N. C. 410 (1877), Pierce v. Perkins, 16 N. C. 250,(1832).
"Clanton v. Price, Admr. 90 N. C. 96 (1884), Lassiter v. Upchurch, 107
N. C. 411, 12 S. E. 63 (1890); Flippin v. Flippin, 117 N. C. 376, 23 S. E. 321(1895). Section 99 of the Consolidated Statutes provides as follows: "If
the executor, administrator, or collector doubts the justness of any claim so
presented, he may enter into an agreement, in writing, with the claimant, to
refer the matter in controversy, whether the same be of a legal or equitable
nature, to one or more disinterested persons, not exceeding three, whose pro-
ceedings shall be the same in all respects as if such reference had been ordered
in an action. Such agreement to refer, and the award thereupon, shall be filed
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CONTROVERSIES WHICH CAN BE ARBITRATED
(a) Provisions of the Statute.
The act places no restrictions on the types of disputes which can be
arbitrated under it. Two or more parties can submit "any con-
troversy." (Section 1). The discussion of this matter by the Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws indicates that this
clause was understood to be general-to allow "all matters of con-
troversy." Quite clearly, however, restrictions will be placed upon
the clause according to the good judgment of the supreme court in
the particular case.
(b) Cases at Common Law.
In the common law cases the supreme court has reiterated the
general proposition that a cause can be submitted to arbitration if
there is "bona fide difference of opinion" between the parties and
regardless of whether the claim or claims involved could be made the
basis of a legal or equitable proceeding.4 7
THE SUBMISSION AGREEMENT
(a) Formal Requisites-Provisions of the Statute.
Section 1 of the Act prescribes that the agreement shall be in
writing. This requirement obtains regardless of the type of con-
troversy. Section 2 also enacts the following general matter: "That
the arbitration agreement must state the question or questions in con-
troversy with sufficient definiteness to present one or more issues or
questions upon which an award may be based."
As has been noted heretofore the act does not embrace future-
disputes clauses. Section 1 is concerned with a written agreement to
arbitrate any controversy which exists between the parties "at the
time of the agreement to submit." But suppose that parties enter
into a written future-dispute clause and wish to abide 'by it when a
controversy arises, will it be necessary for them to execute a new
agreement in writing in order to submit the dispute to arbitration
under the act? If the parties to such future-disputes clause do not
in the Clerk's office where the letters were granted, and shall be a lawful
voucher for the personal representative. The same may be impeached in any
proceeding against the personal representative for fraud therein: Provided,
that the right to refer claims under this section shall extend to claims in favor
of the estate as well as those against it." See McLeod v. Graham, 132 N. C.
473, 43 S. E. 935 (1903) ; Dunn v. Beaman, 126 N. C. 766, 36 S. E. 172 (1900).
"'Findlay v. Ray, 50 N. C. 125 (1857) ; Parrish v. Strickland, 52 N. C. 504(1860).
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execute such new written agreement will they have agreed in writing
"to submit to arbitration, in confbrmity with the provisions of this
act," any controversy then existing between them? Is it a formal
requisite that the parties shall agree in their writing to arbitrate pur-
suant to the provisions of the act? Except for the difficulty presented
by this last question and the clause quoted above-it would seem that
if the parties participated in arbitration pursuant to a written future-
disputes clause after a controversy had arisen thereunder until award
rendered, that at least the award might plausibly be given effect
under the act although the paper agreement was originally executed
when no controversy existed. Certainly under the Uniform Act the
matter of time in physically executing the arbitration bargain can be
of no controlling importance in such case regardless of how objec-
tionable irrevocable and specifically enforceable future-disputes
clauses may have seemed to the Commissioners. Section 2, however,
adds its difficulty in this connection by prescribing that "the question
or questions of controversy" shall be particularized in the agreement.
However, it would seem doubtful if that section excludes a submission
of "any and all disputes existing between them [the parties]" with
respect to a designated contract or series of contracts or transactions.
Certainly such agreement would state a question "with sufficient defi-
niteness to present one or more issues or questions upon which an
award may be based." If this is true a future-disputes clause in a
general written contract embracing "any dispute arising out of this
contract" or any similar general clause might well be held, it is sub-
mitted, to qualify under section 2 where the parties have subsequently
become involved in such a dispute and have gone forward with an
arbitration thereunder to an award. On the other hand, it will be
argued that "the arbitration agreement mentioned in section 2 relates
to the arbitration agreement referred to in section 1, viz., to a written
agreement of two or more parties to submit "any controversy existing
between" them at the time of the agreement to submit," and that a
future-disputes clause executed prior to the existence of a con-
troversy does not qualify under section 1. Against this argument
the suggestion recurs that the mere matter of time when the paper
document is physically executed cannot be deemed material if the
parties in fact participate under it with respect to a dispute arising
thereunder until award rendered, and that it would be plausible to
hold that such award is effective according to the provisions of the
act. However, the clause "in conformity with the provisions of this
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act," as it stands in section 1, seems to indicate, as heretofore noted,
that the parties' written agreement must stipulate or otherwise indi-
cate quite dearly that they submit their existing controversy pursuant
to the act in order to invoke the act. If this is true it may be ad-
mitted that at least if the parties do not invoke the application of the
act in their future-disputes clause an award rendered under the con-
ditions in question may not be governed thereby.4 8
(b) Cases at Common Law.
Several cases have come before the supreme court concerning the
formal requisites of a submission agreement embracing a dispute con-
cerning land. In the leading case of Crissnwin v. Crissman,49 it was
declared that a submission agreement must be by deed in case of a
dispute over the title to land in order to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds. Whether a written submission not under seal (i.e. "by
deed") is valid does not clearly appear. 50 Likewise it has been held
that an oral submission for the partition of land is insufficient under
the Statute of Frauds.51 That the award is in writing in such cases
does not cure the defect of an oral submission.5 2
An allied question of formal requisites has arisen in common
law cases (none of which, however, involved an agreement to sub-
mit a controversy over a title to land), as to the admissibility of
testimonial or other evidence for either of the following purposes:
(1) to show what matters were actually presented to the arbitrators
by the parties at the hearing so as to extend the scope of a written
submission agreement of a specific controversy; (2) to establish that
a certain specific matter in controversy was or was not intended by
the parties to be embraced within general and comprehensive terms
in a submission agreement by evidence that such matter was or was
'The advantages of the statutory method of enforcing an award as com-
pared with common law methods are set forth, infra, under title: Procedure
to Enforce Awards-Awards Effective as Judgments-Methods of Execution.
27 N. C. 498 (1845). The submission agreement in this case was oral.
Held that the award could not be pleaded in bar of an action of ejectment
because of the form of the submission. Accord Pearsall v. Mayers, 60 N. C.
549 (1870), (award also oral) ; Cutter v. Cutter, 169 N. C. 482, 86 S. E. 301
(1915), (the award was in writing).
' But see Cutter v. Cutter, 169 N. C. 482, 86 S. E. 301 (1915), which indi-
cates, but without discussing the specific point, that a writing may be enough.
And see infra, title: Effect of an Award on Title to Land or Chattels.
"Fort v. Allen, 110 N. C. 183, 14 S. E. 685 (1892), submission must be in
writing.
"Cutter v. Cutter, supra, note 50. The question of the formal requisites
of a submission agreement involving title to chattels was expressly reserved in
Alston v. Hamlin, 19 N. C. 115 (1836).
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not presented by the parties to the arbitrators at the hearing. In
Osborne v. Calvert, 3 Ruffin, J. expressed doubt whether a plaintiff
in an action to enforce an award could show that a certain matter not
expressly embraced in the terms of a written submission agreement
were in fact presented by the parties before the arbitrators for de-
cision if the terms of the submission were "clear and explicit in them-
selves." He held, however, in the same case, that where the parties,
who were partners, submitted matters of controversy "about and
concerning the dealings and mutual accounts kept by themselves for
the last several years . . . [and] . . . all things and considerations
relating thereto" that the defendant could show that the arbitrators
considered matters relating to their partnership accounts only and
that a note given by the plaintiff to the defendant prior to the forma-
tion of this partnership "came neither within the scope of the original
intention of the parties, nor the action of the arbitrators." In Cheat-
ham v. Rowland54 it was held under a submission agreement describ-
ing in general terms the matters which were submitted, that the de-
fendant was entitled to prove that the claim sued on by the plaintiff
was in fact prosecuted 'before the arbitrators and embraced in the
award and that therefore the award was a bar to plaintiff's action.
Likewise, in Robertson v. Marshall"5 the parties agreed to submit
"certain matters of difference or disagreement . . . on account of
their contractual and trade relations and their dealings with each
other entered into and had . . . relating to the lumber business and
all else incident thereto [and] do submit all such matters of disagree-
ment or difference . . . " The court regarded the terms of this sub-
mission as "very broad and comprehensive," and said that "if they
do not of themselves include this trade about the big mill, as we are
inclined to hold, they are without doubt sufficiently definite and cer-
tain to constitute a valid submission and to permit of parol evidence
to fit them to the subject matter." The evidence offered to "fit them
to the subject matter" related to the matters which were in fact pre-
sented to the arbitrators at the hearing.56
It remains to be observed whether the rule of these cases will be
extended to agreements to submit disputes concerning "title to land,"
and to written agreements which are governed by the new statute.
' 86 N. C. 170; s. c. 83 N. C. 365 (1880).
105 N. C. 218, 10 S. E. 986 (1890).
-155 N. C. 167, 71 S. E. 67 (1911).
"The arbitrators are competent to testify to what matters were presented
before them. Robertson v. Marshall, supra, note 55. See also, infra, title,
Awards in Disputes involving Land-Formal Requisites.
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(c) Construction of the Submission Agreement-What Disputes Did
the Parties Submit.
The problem of construing anarbitration agreement is almost ever
present.5 7 The question generally is: what disputes did the parties in
question agree to arbitrate? It is clear that the arbitrators do not
have the power to decide this question-the question of their juris-
diction. The supreme court has remarked on this point as follows:
"What are the terms of the submission, what is the true con-
struction of such terms, and what things are embraced 'within them,
may present questions of law or of fact, and when presented the
questions of law can only be decided conclusively, not by the arbitra-
tors, 'but by the proper judicial tribunals of the country."58
In accord with the common law decisions of other states the
supreme cburt has held that a general submission of the debts and
claims of the parties gives the arbitrators no power to decide disputes
which accrue after the submission agreement was executed. 59 How-
ever, where disputes concerning the settlement of an estate arose
between the executor and legatee and heirs and were submitted to
arbitration the court declared that "the object of the reference was
to settle the estate . . . and by a proper construction of the bond it
extended to all matters and things for, and on account of which, the
defendant was liable, as executor, and in which the parties, who were
children of the testator, were interested." 60 It may be inferred from
this statement that all matters of dispute necessary to settle the estate,
even those arriving after the submission and up to the date of the
award, are to be adjusted in each case-that the arbitrators can and
should decide them.
Whether a particular matter goes to the question of the "jurisdic-
tion" of the arbitrators is not always dear. Where the parties, who
were partners, submitted "all the said matters of controversy and all
matters of difference in relation to, or in any wise concerning said
partnership," the court ruled that "it would seem to be a matter of
course that when arbitrators are chosen to settle a co-partnership, it
is for them to say what does or does not constitute a part of the
co-partnership effects." 61
" See Noble v. Wiggins, 52 N. C. 535 (1860) ; Cutter v. Cutter, 169 N. C.
482, 86 S. E. 301 (1915).
Walker v. Walker, 60 N. C. 259 (1864).
Borretts v. Patterson, 1 N. C. 126 (1799).
Brown v. Brown, 49 N. C. 123 (1856). See also Masters v. Gardner, 50
N. C. 298 (1858).
' Masters v. Gardner, supra, note 63.
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REvoCABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT OF SUBMISSION AGREEMENTS
(a) Provisions of the Statute.
Section 1 provides that if parties agree in writing to arbitrate an
existing controversy as therein stated that "neither party shall have
the power to revoke the submission without the consent of the other
party or parties to the submission save upon such grounds as exist in
law or equity for the rescission on revocation of any contract." By
the same section the agreement shall be "valid and enforceable."
There is only this general declaration in the statute upon which to
predicate the conclusion that the submission agreement is irrevocable
in either of the following senses: (1) that the agreement can be
pleaded to abate or to bar an action in court which is brought on a
cause subject to the agreement; (2) that neither party can terminate
the agreement before or after arbitrators are appointed by giving
notice prior to an award rendered.
The common law power of a party to defeat an arbitration by
neglecting or refusing to appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators is
changed by section 4, as follows:
"That upon the application in writing of any party to the arbitration
agreement and upon notice to the other parties thereto, the court shall
appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators in any of the following cases:
"(a) When the arbitration agreement does not prescribe a
method for the appointment of arbitrators, in which case the arbi-
tration shall be by three arbitrators;
"(b) When the arbitration agreement does prescribe a method
for the appointment of arbitrators, and the arbitrators, or any of
them, have not been appointed and the time within which they should
have been appointed has expired;
"(3) When any arbitrator fails or is otherwise unable to act, and
his successor has not been appointed in the manner in which he was
appointed. Arbitrators appointed -by the court shall have the same
power as though their appointment had been made in accordance with
the agreement to arbitrate."'
Section 7 likewise provides for an ex parte hearing and default
award after notice so that a recalcitrant party can not, generally, at
least, defeat an arbitration by refusing to participate in the arbitral
hearing. This section appears to codify the prevailing common law
rule of the American states.
While the foregoing statutory provisions look to the enforcement
of the arbitration agreement indirectly by preventing its revocation
and by authorizing substitute measures if a party refuses to perform,
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it may be noted that the statute does not expressly provide a pro-
cedure by which to procure a decree for specific performance of the
agreement by a party. There is, however, the general declaration in
section 1 that the agreement shall be " valid and enforceable." As
such statutory declaration -was not necessary to make the agreement
"valid and enforceable" in the sense that it would support an action
for at least nominal damages at common law, it may be argued that
this general provision is designed to make the agreement specifically
enforceable. On the other hand, it may be argued that this general
provision merely codifies the common law rule and that the new sub-
stitute measures expressly provided in sections 4 and 7 indicate that
compulsory specific performance by a party is not contemplated by
the act.62 The question remains for the future decision of the
supreme court.
(b) Cases at Common Law.
From the earliest cases the supreme court has taken the general
position that an agreement of submission is revocable in the sense
that it cannot be pleaded in bar to an action brought on a cause sub-
ject to the agreement. Thus, it has said: "If the plaintiff, having
agreed to arbitrate as alleged, afterwards refused to comply with the
agreement such breach thereof might be a cause of action, but not
one to be set up as a defense in this action." 63  It has likewise de-
clared that the agreement is revocable directly by notice prior to
award rendered, and has explained its ruling as follows: "Where a
submission to arbitration is made by the mere agreement of the
parties, beyond question, either of the parties can revoke such sub-
mission at any time before the award is made, although he may
thereby render himself liable to an action for a breach of his agree-
ment. Every naked authority, until an act -be done under it, is in law
countermandable by him who has granted it."64
The case of Williams v. Branning Mfg. Co. 65 is a leading Ameri-
can case concerning direct revocation of the submission agreement
by bringing an action in court on a cause which is subject to the agree-
ment. After the submission and hearing but before award rendered,
the plaintiff proceeded to bring an action in court on the same con-
Compare on this point the new arbitration statutes which follow the New
York and United States Act, Sturges, op. cit., supra, note 42.
" Carpenter v. Tucker, 98 N. C. 316, 3 S. E. 831 (1887).
e Tyson v. Robinson, 25 N. C. 333 (1843)-reference of pending action
under rule of court.
153 N. C. 7, 68 S. E. 902 (1910).
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troversy. He caused the summons to be served in the action before
the award was rendered, ,but neither the complaint nor any bill of
particulars was filed until after the award was rendered and pub-
lished. It was held that there was no revocation. The court sum-
marized its position as follows:
"The revocation to be effective must be express unless there is a
revocation by implication of law, and in case of express revocation,
in order to make it complete, notice must be given to the arbitrators.
It is ineffective until this has been done. . . . It is contended that
commencing an action is a revocation -by legal implication. Such
revocations arise from the legal effect of some intervening happening
after submission, either by act of God or caused by the party, and
which necessarily puts an end to the business.
"The death of a party, or arbitrator, or marriage of a femme sole,
lunacy of a party, or the utter destruction and final end of the subject
matter, are of this description."6  But whether the bringing of an
action for the subject matter of an arbitration after submission and
before award is an implied revocation, is a matter about which the
courts differ....
"Until a complaint is filed the defendant had no legal notice of the
cause of action and the arbitrators had a right to proceed with the
pending arbitration and to render their award."
It is inferred that these rules of revocability of a submission
agreement are not different in a court of equity or in a court exer-
cising equitable powers.67 It has been held that where the submis-
sion was revoked by notice before award rendered that there was a
sufficient defense at law so that an injunction would not issue to
enjoin the enforcement of an arbitration bond given to abide an
award.6 8
The court has also held that equitable remedy should be denied
in the following case: The defendant agreed to sell his mill to the
plaintiff at its cost to him (the defendant). This price, it was agreed,
should be determined by four persons then named. These arbitrators
could not agree; the defendant refused to refer the question to an
umpire to be selected by the arbitrators and he also refused to appoint
new arbitrators. The plaintiff sought to compel the defendant to
render an account of the cost of the mill to him and to convey upon
'And see Tyson v. Robinson, 25 N. C. 333 (1843), Whitfield v. Whitfield,
30 N. C. 163 (1847). Whether agreements which are governed by the statute
will be subject to these rules remains to be determined. See Matter of Scott,
200 App. Div. 599, 193 N. Y. Supp. 403 (1922), aff'd, without opinion, 234
N. Y. 539, 138 N. E. 438 (1922).
See Norfleet v. Southall, 7 N. C. 189 (1819).
' Gardner v. Marsters, 56 N. C. 462 (1857).
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receipt of the payment by plaintiff of the amount so ascertained.
Held that the 'bill was demurrable. The court assigned the following
reasons for its decision: "The substance and effect, then, of South-
all's agreement was: 'not that I will sell you my share of the mill
upon your paying me what it cost; but I will sell it to you, provided
four certain persons, to 'be named by us, unite in their judgment and
opinion as to what it cost. If they do not concur in opinion, there is
no contract beween us.' The paries have made an effort towards con-
tracting, which has terminated in an inchoate agreement; and if this
court were to direct a reference to the master, or any other person, to
ascertain the price, and decree upon such a report, it would be
making a contract for the parties and then enforcing it." 69
As indicated by the opinions which have already been quoted, it
is apparent that the revocation of a submission agreement without
sufficient cause gives the aggrieved party an action for damages.
Whether more than nominal damages will be allowed has not been
decided.7 0 However, sufficient cause for revocation may be shown
so that no damages will be recovered. Thus, in Wynne v. Lumber
Co.7 1 it was held that intentionally getting a material witness drunk
-by a party for the purpose of keeping him from testifying at the
arbitral hearing was sufficient cause to revoke the agreement.7 2
PROVISIONAL AND ANCILLARY REMEDIEs
(a) Provisions of the Statute.
Section 12 of the act provides as follows: "That at any time be-
fore final determination of the arbitration the court may upon appli-
cation of a party to the submission make such order or decree or take
such proceeding as it may deem necessary for the preservation of the
'Norfleet v. Southall, 7 N. C. 189 (1819). See also Williams v. Wood,
12 N. C. 82 (1826).
" Where a penal obligation to perform and not revoke the arbitration agree-
ment has been given apparently the full penalty can be recovered upon breach
of the obligation if the penal sum is not, in the opinion of the court, "unjust
or disproportionate to the damage sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the
violation of the contract by the defendant." See Pendleton v. Electric Light
Co., 121 N. C. 20, 27 S. E. 1003 (1897), and Wynne v. Lumber Co., 179 N. C.
320, 102 S. E. 403 (1920). Compare cases cited, infra, note 135.
"179 N. C. 320, 102 S. E. 403 (1920).
" Quaere whether such matters as create a legal privilege to revoke a sub-
mission agreement at common law will give a legal power fo a party to revoke
an agreement which is governed by the statute. According to the statute
neither party can revoke such an agreement without the consent of the other
"save upon such grounds as exist in law or equity for the rescission or revoca-
tion of any contract" (Section 1).
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property or for securing satisfaction of the award." In the delibera-
tions of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, it
appears from the expressions of certain commissioners that this sec-
tion is designed "to prevent any one from disposing of the property
or removing the property that is in question before the award takes
place."73  (Italics are the writer's.) Others referred to its purpose
to prevent a party to a submission agreement from "clandestinely or
secretly hiding out and disposing of his property which might be
available when the final award should be executed, and . . . simply
provides that in that event the court can entertain a proceeding to
hold that property to satisfy the final award of the arbitration. '7 4
No common law cases have been discovered wherein a party to
an arbitration agreement has sought to have the adverse party ar-
rested or to have an attachment, an injunction, ,or the appointment of
a receiver or a garnishment executed against him or his property and
credits in order to preserve the status quo pending the arbitration or
to assure recovery on a favorable award.
It is clear that a large number of contentious propositions are
involved in attempting to reconcile section 12 of the Arbitration Act
with the various statutory provisions governing the remedies in ques-
tion. These questions are multiplied because of the fact that the
statutes which govern the remedies in question are predicated upon
the existence of an ordinary "civil action."'75 Like difficulties lie in
the path of a party to a common law submission agreement who
would use such remedies without resort to any action and without
prejudice to the arbitration agreement. 76
REQUISITES CONCERNING ARBITRATORS
(a) Number of Arbitrators.
Neither the statute nor common law rules prescribe a maximum
or minimum number of arbitrators. The agreement of the parties
governs. Sections 4 of the statute provides, however, as heretofore
noted, that upon the application in writing of any party to the arbitra-
tion agreement the court shall appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators
"' Handbook, Nat'l Conference of Coners. on Uniform State Laws, 73 et seq.(1924).
" Handbook, op. cit., smpra, note 73.
" Consult Consolidated Statutes (1919), Sections 767, 768, 798, 843-858, 860.See also deliberations of Nat'l Conference of Commissioners on this section.
Handbook (1924).
"' In this connection consult Williams & Bro. v. Branning Mfg. Co., supra,
note 65 and the report of the case in the text connected therewith.
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in any of the following cases: (a) When the arbitration agreement
does not prescribe a miethod for the appointment of arbitrators, in
which case the arbitration shall be by three arbitrators . ." (Italics
are the writer's.)
A question of construing a particular arbitration agreement will
frequently arise in connection with this general topic to determine
how many arbitrators have been agreed upon by the parties. In
Crawford v. Orr77 the parties submitted a boundary line dispute "to
two disinterested men [who were chosen] together with A. L. Patter-
son, a surveyor, with the privilege of calling in a third party in case
they fail to agree . ..and to bear the expenses of the referees and
surveyor equally." It was held that Patterson was not an arbitrator,
but rather a designated technical assistant to the two arbitrators and
that therefore the award of the two was valid within the common law
rule requiring an unanimous award. Similarly, an award by A under
a submission to A or B was held to be conclusive upon the parties.
"The submission," said the court, "was .. . to either one."17 8
(b) "Arbitrators," "Third Arbitrator" and "Umpire" Distinguished.
The statute does not mention any distinction; the term "umpire"
does not appear in the act. In the common law cases an "umpire"
is frequently distinguished from an "arbitrator" and "third arbitra-
tor." A submission to A and B, arbitrators, with authority to choose
an "umpire" or "third party" forthwith or in event that the two shall
disagree, gives the third person so chosen, if an "umpire," a distinct
position in arbitration law in several different instances3 9 It remains
to be observed when, if ever, the supreme court will construe the
term "arbitrator," as used in the act, to include an "umpire."
(c) Qualifications of Arbitrators and Umpire.
The act is silent on the matter. Two or more parties may agree
in writing to submit "to arbitration." (Section 1).
In a single pertinent common law decision it was held that an
offer to show concerning one of two arbitrators that his mind was
impaired, that it was not so strong and vigorous as it had been, was
properly rejected. The court also held that evidence that an arbitra-
tor was drunk was not material unless he were shown to have been
82 N. C. 246 (1881).
Hemphill v. Gaithers, 180 N. C. 604, 105 S. E. 183 (1920).
"See cases cited, infra, note 89.
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so drunk that he did not know what he was doing-that his mind
had become a "fatuity." 80
Apparently it is the position of the supreme court that "interest"
in the cause and relationship to one of the parties will not disqualify
a person from acting as arbitrator or umpire if the parties submit
the case to him with knowledge of the facts. If the facts were
unknown to a party it is intimated that the arbitration and award
can be defeated at least by that party."' The court has stated, how-
ever, that "no relief . . . will be granted unless objection is made as
soon as the aggrieved party becomes aware of the facts." If the
party discovers the disqualifying cause prior to award but continues
to participate in the hearing until award without objection it is clear
that he cannot contest the award.8 2
(d) How Elected or Appointed.
Neither the statute nor common law rules prescribe a method of
selecting arbitrators or an umpire. The parties are left to their
agreement and subject to the common law rules of revocability in
case of common law submissions. 83 Section 4 of the act provides as
follows: "That upon the application in writing of any party to the
arbitration agreement and upon notice to the other parties thereto,
the court shall appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators in any of the fol-
lowing cases:
(a) When the arbitration agreement does not prescribe a method
for the appointment of arbitrators, in which case the arbitration shall
be by three arbitrators.
(b) When the arbitration agreement does prescribe a method for
the appointment of arbitrators, and the arbitrators, or any of them,
have not been appointed and the time within which they should have
been appointed has expired.
(c) When any arbitrator fails or is otherwise unable to act, and
his successor has not been appointed in the manner in which he was
appointed.
81Devereux v. Burgwin, 33 N. C. 490 (1850).
8 See Pearson v. Barringer, 109 N. C. 398, 13 S. E. 942 (1891) ; Nelson v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 157 N. C. 194, 72 S. E. 998 (1911).
Pearson v. Barringer, supra, note 81.
81 See Phoenix Hosiery Co. v. Griffin Smith & Co., 16 Phila 568 (Pa.,
1883) ; Gray v. Wilson, 4 Watts 39 (Pa., 1835). Compare State ex rel. Faucher
v. Everett, supra, note 15.
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Arbitrators appointed -by the court shall have the same power as
though their appointment had been made in accordance with the
agreement to arbitrate."
It is readily inferred from subsection (a) that the submission
agreement may qualify under the act although the arbitrators are not
named therein and although no method of choosing them is set forth
therein.
The section does not seem sufficiently clear upon many proposi-
tions, however, for example, the following: (1) If the parties have
agreed upon a method of selecting arbitrators but it is not set forth
in the arbitration agreement can one party invoke section 4 (a) and
have three arbitrators appointed by the court? Must he in such case
invoke section 4 (a) and have three arbitrators appointed by the court
as therein provided in lieu of the performance of the method agreed
upon -by the parties if the other party refuses to participate under
that agreement? (2) If the parties provide in a collateral agreement
that each will appoint an arbitrator and that the two shall appoint
an umpire or a third arbitrator, and one party refuses to appoint will
the court appoint three arbitrators under section 4 (a) or only two
arbitrators to act with an arbitrator appointed by the petitioning
party, or will it appoint only one arbitrator who with the one ap-
pointed by the petitioning party shall appoint an umpire or third
arbitrator? (3) When the agreement to arbitrate does not prescribe
a method for the appointment of arbitrators and three arbitrators are
appointed under section 4 (a) what if anything is intended -by the last
paragraph of the section which provides that arbitrators so appointed
"shall have the same power as though their appointment had been
made in accordance with the agreement to arbitrate?" (Italics are
the writer's.) Further examples of the ambiguity of this section
would unduly extend the consideration of the topic under considera-
tion. Perhaps it is beyond doubt that if the parties provide in the
submission agreement that they will select three arbitrators the court
can be applied to under section 4 (b) of the act and that it will act
consistently with their agreement at least in the particular that all or
at least part of the three arbitrators will be appointed when necessary
to effect the arbitration under the agreement.
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PROCEDURE LEADING TO THE ARBITRAL HEARING
(a) Appointment of Time and Place of Meeting-By Whom--
Notice.
Section 6 of the statute provides as follows: "That the arbitrators
shall appoint a time and place for the hearing, and notify the parties
thereof . . ." Probably all of the arbitrators must participate and
concur in fixing the time and place of the hearing and in giving the
notice. Correct procedure in this respect will assume obvious im-
portance when an ex parte hearing is had under section 7 which pro-
vides that "if any party neglects to appear before the arbitrators
after reasonable notice the arbitrators may nevertheless proceed to
hear and determine the controversy upon the evidence which is pro-
duced 'before them." If a party appeared and participated in the arbi-
tral hearing presumably he would be held to "waive" irregularities in
this connection.
These statutory provisions apparently codify the prevailing com-
mon law rule.
(b) Procuring Attendance of Witnesses.
Section 10 enacts that "the arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority
of them, may require any person to attend before him or them8 4 as
a witness. . . Subpoenas shall issue in the name of the arbitrator
or arbitrators, or a majority of them, and shall be signed by the
arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority of them, and shall be directed
to the person and shall be served in the same manner as subpoenas
to testify before a court of record in this state."
If a person is duly subpoened and neglects or refuses to obey the
subpoena, "upon petition the court may compel the attendance of
such person ... or punish said person for contempt in the same
manner now provided for the attendance of witnesses or the punish-
ment of them in the courts of the state." Whether the arbitrators
and the interested party, or either, shall make the foregoing petition
is not stated.
Such subpoenas may likewise issue to a person "to bring with
him any book or writing or other evidence." Like compulsory
process is available for failure or refusal to comply.
If the arbitrators refuse to issue subpoenas to procure testi-
' It is not clear that the second pronoun "them" can refer to "a majority
of them" in view of probable quorum-requisites. See infra, title, Proceedings
at the Arbitral Hearing-(a) Quorum of Arbitrators.
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monial or other evidence from a person because they do not deem it
material to the case is their decision final? It seems apparent that
the aggrieved party can invoke sections i3 and 16 in such case. Sec-
tion 13 prescribes that the arbitrators "shall by request of a party to
the arbitration: (a) At any stage of the proceedings submit any
question of law arising in the course of the hearing for the opinion
of the court, stating the facts upon which the question arises, and
such opinion when given shall bind the arbitrators in the making of
their award." If, however, the question at hand is not to be con-
strued as "any question of law arising in the course of the hearing,"
which, when decided by the court, would be effective to "bind the
arbitrators in the making of their award," it remains to notice sec-
tion 16. By that section if the party sustains an adverse award he
can apply to the court to have the award vacated for the following
cause: "(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct, ...
in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the con-
troversy." If there is any doubt as to the application of section 16 to
the case at hand, it lies in the proposition that a refusal to subpoena
a witness or evidence is not a refusal "to hear evidence" as provided
in that section.
No cases have been discovered which deal with the procurement
of witnesses in a common law arbitration. It is not clear that the
statutes authorize subpoenas to issue to procure witnesses or docu-
mentary evidence in such an arbitration.8 5
(c) Procuring Depositions.
Under Section 11 "depositions may be taken with or without a
commission in the same manner and for the same reasons as provided
'by law for the taking of depositions in suits pending in the courts of
record in this state."
It is doubted if depositions can be taken for use before common
law arbitrators.8 6
PROCEEDINGS AT THE ARBITRAL HEARING
(a) Quorum of Arbitrators.
The statute has no express provision in point. Section 3949 of
the Consolidated Statutes provides as follows: "(2) All words pur-
porting to give a joint authority to three or more public officers or
"5 Consult Consolidated Statutes (1919), Section 919.
"' Consult Consolidated Statutes (1919), Sections 900, 901.
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other persons shall be construed as giving such authority to a ma-
jority of such officers or other persons, unless it shall be otherwise
expressly declared in the law giving the authority." The supreme
court has indicated dearly, however, that this statute applies only
when the three or more persons are appointed by a statute.8' It is,
therefore, inferred that even if this statute embraces the question of
quorum, which may be doubtful, it does not apply to arbitrators
selected by the parties or to the three arbitrators 'who are appointed
by the court under section 4a.
The prevailing American statutory and common law rule requires
that all of the arbitrators shall meet and act together. In Devereux
v. Burgvin,8 3 however, where tenants in common agreed to divide
their land and submitted the valuation of their respective parts to A
and B, "the valuation to -be made upon such examinations and sur-
veys as the referees may think proper, of which they shall be the
sole and exclusive judges," the supreme court held that the fact that
B did not go on the land and examine it did not invalidate the award
of A and B. The court relied upon the last clause of the submission
for authority to the arbitrators to make the examination and survey
by only one of them if they thought proper.
If an umpire is selected it is inferred that he can hear the cause
alone8 9 unless the terms of the submission clearly contemplate his
contemporaneous sitting with' the arbitrators to act as umpire be-
tween them when and as they disagree on specific questions during
the progress of the hearing and in rendering their award.
However, even when an umpire is chosen to decide the whole
cause, the proceedings are not affected by the participation of the
arbitrators in the hearing and in signing his award. It is likewise
true that the participation of an umpire in the proceedings of the
arbitrators will not invalidate their action. The supreme court ex-
plained its position in such case as follows: "The award in our case
is either the award of the umpire or the award of the arbitrators.
Take it either way it is good."90
(b) Selection of an Umpire or Third Arbitrator.
A submission agreement may authorize the originally appointed
' See Oakley v. Anderson, 93 N. C. 108 (1885).
"33 N. C. 490 (1850).
' Stevens v. Bran, 82 N. C. 460 (1880) ; Bryan v. Jeffreys, 104 N. C. 242,
10 S. E. 167 (1889).
"See cases cited, supra, note 89.
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arbitrators to choose a "third party," a "third arbitrator," or an
"umpire." This choice may be authorized 
-without any time being
specified therefor, or there may be the usual authorization for the
arbitrators to elect or appoint the third person "in case they cannot
agree." If this last quoted clause is construed to authorize the ap-
pointment only "after they have disagreed" a second hearing will be
necessary unless the original arbitrators are unanimous in their first
decision. The supreme court has held that it is no objection that the
arbitrators appointed the third person before they commenced the
hearing-at least an award rendered in proceedings in which such
third party participated without exception taken by either party was
declared valid, and this was so held although the third person was
necessary to the majority award which was authorized in the sub-
mission. The court said: "It matters not at what time during the
progress of an arbitration the umpire is appointed. It is within the
discretion of the arbitrators to appoint him before or after their
disagreement." 9 1
Apparently there are no indispensable formal requisites in ap-
pointing the third person in such cases. In Bryan v. Jeffreys the
submission was under seal. The court indicated that the appoint-
ment of the third party was not required to be under seal, nor, ap-
parently, even in writing. At least it was held that such a matter
could not be raised after award and, in that case, a part performance
thereof by the complaining party.
Reference has already been made not only to the fact that the new
statute does not use the term "umpire" but also to some of the causes
of uncertainty concerning the application of the statute to a submis-
sion agreement which provides for the appointment of an umpire or
third arbitrator in the manner here considered.
(c) Proceedings in Absence of a Party-Ex Parte Proceedings.
Section 7, of the act provides as follows: "That if any party neg-
lects to appear before the arbitrators after reasonable notice the arbi-
trators may nevertheless proceed to hear and determine the con-
troversy upon the evidence which is produced before them." This
section appears to codify in general terms the' prevailing American
common law rule.
It is certain, however, to present its difficulties in administration.
If a party, after reasonable notice, refuses to attend the hearing will
' Stevens v. Brown, Bryan v. Jeffreys, supra, note 89.
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he be held to have "waived" such defects of procedure as he would
be held to have waived if he had appeared and participated in the
hearing? For example, if less than all of the arbitrators participate
in appointing the time and place of hearing and in giving notice
thereof, will the absent party be held to have "waived" the defect as
he apparently would be held to do by participating in the hearing
without objection? Will he "waive" the requisite for a full quorum
as he might be held to do if he appeared before less than the full
board of arbitrators without objection? It seems doubtful. If the
absent party sustains an adverse default or ex parte award it would
seem clear that he could attack the award on other grounds, also, as,
for example, that the arbitrators determined more or less matters
than the submission agreement authorized-a question of their juris-
diction-and, in general, on any other grounds provided in the act as
cause for vacating awards governed thereby.
(d) Requisite that Arbitrators and Umpire be Sworn.
The statute does not require an oath. No common law cases in
point have been discovered in North Carolina. Forms of oaths for
various persons are prescribed in section 2199 of the Consolidated
Statutes, but none appears for arbitrators.
(e) Requisite that Witnesses be Sworn.
There is no express requirement in the act that witnesses shall be
sworn. No common law cases in point have been discovered. The
oath prescribed by section 3199 of the Consolidated Statutes for a
witness in a "civil action" is not adapted to a witness at an arbitra-
tion.
(f) Arbitrators Powers to Examine Witnesses and Documents.
By section 6 of the statute the arbitrators are required to give
both parties reasonable opportunity to be heard before them as a
board, and by section 16 they must "hear evidence pertinent and ma-
terial to the controversy." Clearly their powers are coextensive with
their duties in this connection. But can the arbitrators assume the
r6le of inquirer and examine and cross-examine witnesses and inspect
and verify documentary evidence? Presumably they have these
powers. It remains to be determined whether they are restricted in
the exercise of these powers to evidence which is adduced at the
hearing.92
"See Berizzi Co. Inc. v. Krauz, 208 App. Div. 322 (1924), reversed 239
N. Y. 315, 146 N. E. 436 (1925). Consult Gardner v. Marsters, 56 N. C. 462(1857).
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Common law decisions restrain the arbitrators from examining
one party's evidence privately and in the absence of the other at
least when the latter participates in the hearing. The supreme court
has stated the rule as follows: "The first principle of justice requires
that no private instructions should :be received, nor evidence heard,
without giving the other party an opportunity of being present. The
arbitrator may be influenced by such representations insensibly to
himself; and the party has a right to know the proof, that he may
object to it if improper, or answer it, if proper.9 3
(g) Rules Governing the Admissability of Evidence.
While the Supreme Court has remarked that "arbitrators have
great latitude of discretion; they are not bound by the strict rules of
law" in admitting evidence at the hearing,94 it was held in Hurdle
v. Stallings9 5 that where the arbitrator rejects evidence which does
not appear to have been immaterial the award shall be set aside. The
court explained the duty of arbitrators in this respect as follows:
"Arbitrators have some power within their discretion to determine
how much evidence they will hear, but it is their general duty to hear
all evidence material to the case which is offered."
Under section 16 of the act an award rendered in a statutory arbi-
tration shall be vacated if the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct
"in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the con-
troversy." It seems clear from this section that the court will review
the conduct of the arbitrators in refusing to hear evidence at the
hearing and that it will review the question whether rejected evi-
dence was "pertinent and material to the controversy." It remains
to be observed, however, whether the court will follow the position
which it took in Hurdle v. Stallings and hold in proceedings under
section 16 that an award will be vacated as of course unless the
record affirmatively shows, or it is otherwise made to appear, that
the rejected evidence was immaterial-a matter of at least procedural
importance.
It is inferred that the arbitrators in common law arbitrations are
the sole judges of the weight and materiality of testimony and evi-
dence which is received by them. Under the statute, however, this
conclusion is subject to the considerations of the next topic.
"Pierce v. Perkins, 17 N. C. 250 (1832). Compare Admrs. of M'Crae v.
Robeson, 6 N. C. 127 (1812) ; Gardner v. Marsters, 56 N. C. 462 (1857).Admrs. of M'Crae v. Robeson, supra, note 93.
"109 N. C. 6, 13 S. E. 720 (1891).
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(h) Disposition of Questions of Law.
The common law cases are uniform in holding that a general sub-
mission to arbitration authorizes and requires the arbitrators to de-
termine the law as well as the facts of the controversy. Only if they
confessedly rely upon a certain proposition as being the law when
it is not is there such a "mistake of law" as is cause to vacate the
award. If they do not assign reasons for their award, if they do not
disclose that they undertook to decide in accordance with propositions
of law which they assumed to be true, the court will not inquire into
the processes of the arbitrators in rendering their award on an al-
legation that the award is "against the law," or that the arbitrators
have made a "mistake of law." The Supreme Court has repeated
the following proposition which it developed at length in the leading
case of King v. The Falls of Neuse Mfg. Co.: "It is well settled that
arbitrators are no more bound to go into particulars and assign
reasons for their award, than a jury is for their verdict. The duty
is 'best discharged 'by a single announcement of the result of their
investigation. It is equally well settled that they are not bound to
decide according to law, for they are a law unto themselves, and
may decide according to their notions of right and without giving
any reasons. If, however, they undertake to decide according to law,
and it appears from the face of the award that they have miscon-
ceived any principle of law applicable to the case, then the award
is void." 96
Section 13 of the new statute changes the law with respect to
arbitrations under the act. It is there provided "that the arbitrators
may, on their own motion, and shall by request of a party to the
arbitration:
(a) At any stage of the proceedings submit any question of law
arising in the course of the hearing for the opinion of the court,
stating the facts upon which the question arises, and such opinion
when given shall 'bind the arbitrators in making their award.
(b) State their final award in the form of a conclusion of fact
for the opinion of the court on the questions of law arising on the
hearing."
-"79 N. C. 360 (1878). See also Cleary v. Caar & Hawks, 2 N. C. 225
(1795) ; Jones v. Frazier, 8 N. C. 379 (1821) ; Ryan v. Blount et a[ Exrs., 16
N. C. 382 (1820) ; Pierce v. Perkins, 17 N. C. 250 (1832) ; Crisp v. Love, 65
N. C 126 (1871) ; Leach v. Harris, 69 N. C. 532 (1873) ; Robbins v. Killebrew,
95 N. C. 19 (1886) ; Smith Admx. v. Kron, 109 N. C. 103, 13 S. E. 839 (1891);
Henry v. Hilliard, 120 N. C 479, 27 S. E. 130 (1897).
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Not only does the Uniform Act depart from the common law of
the American states by this section, but it also departs from the arbi-
tration statutes of all of the American states, except Illinois, which
embrace only agreements to arbitrate existing disputes.
97
The section promises much litigation. Some of the more im-
portant questions which immediately arise will be stated. (1) Can
parties agree to arbitrate "in conformity with the provisions of this
act" (section 1) but expressly agree that the arbitrators shall decide
all questions of law and fact without recourse to section 13? (2)
Can the parties so agree to arbitrate but stipulate that neither of
them will invoke section 13? 98 (3) What is a "question of law" as
distinguished from a "question of fact" for the purposes of this act?
Is the category of "question of law" for purposes of this section to
be that category which is distinguished from the "question-of-fact"
category which appears in pleading cases, in evidence cases, in mis-
representation cases, in reformation and rescission cases in equity, in
appellate review cases? Is the construction or interpretation of a
written document, the existence or non-existence of a trade practice
or the significance of a trade term or symbol in a written document
a "question of law" or a "question of fact" for the purposes of the
statute? (4) Is the question what is the law of a certain state or
country a "question of law" or a "question of fact" for the purpose
at hand? When arbitrators award a purchase price to a seller on an
extra-state shipment is it a "question of law" or a "question of fact"
what, if any, interest shall be allowed to the seller? (5) Are ques-
tions of competency and creditability of witnesses and the admissa-
bility and materiality of testimony in any particular "questions of
law" for the purposes of this statute? (6) Will a court review the
cause after the parties have presented all of their evidence before the
arbitrators but before award is rendered and determine the weight
of the evidence and the legal consequences thereof so that "such
opinion when given shall bind the arbitrators in the making of their
' See Year Book on Commercial Arbitration, op. cit., supra, note 14.
"It has been held by an English court that such agreement is invalid under
the English law. Lord Justice Scrutton stated the matter as follows: "Without
attempting -precisely to define the limits within which an agreement not to take
proceedings in the King's Courts is unenforceable, I think an agreement to
shortcut the power of the King's Courts to guide the proceedings of inferior
tribunals without legal training in matters of law before them is calculated to
lead to erroneous administration of law and therefore injustice, and should
therefore not be recognized -by the courts." Czarnikow & Co. Ltd. v. Roth,
Schmidt & Co. (1922), 28 Com. Ca. 29 (C. A.). Compare, The "Cap Blanc"
[1913], P. 130; Kirschner & Co. v. Gruban [1909], 1 Ch. 413.
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award ?" (7) Is the section designed to pattern the function of the
arbitrators after that of a jury or referee in a civil action ?
(i) Adjournments and Postponements of the Hearing.
Section 6 of the Act provides that "the arbitrators" "may adjourn
the hearing from time to time as may be necessary, and, on applica-
tion of either party, and for good cause, may postpone the hearing
to a time not extending beyond the date fixed for making the award."
Section 16 makes it a cause to vacate an award "(c) When the arbi-
trators weie guilty of misconduct, in refusing to postpone the hear-
ing, upon sufficient cause shown, . .. or of any other misbehavior,
by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced."
It is inferred that the arbitrators in common law arbitrations are
empowered and required to postpone and adjourn hearingstfor suf-
ficient cause.
(j) Retrial Before an Umpire or Third Arbitrator-Notice.
If originally appointed arbitrators fail to agree and pursuant to
the submission agreement they choose a third arbitrator or an umpire
does the cause stand for hearing de novo before the new board of
arbitrators or before the umpire? The statute has no provision in
point; and as heretofore noted the statute does not contain the term
"umpire."
In Bray v. Staples 00 the submission was to M and S and provided
For a criticism of a judicial 'technique which patterns an arbitration after
a court and jury trial, see Isaacs, "Two Views of Commercial Arbitration,"
40 Harvard Law Review, 929 (1927).
Concerning the provisions in the arbitration statutes which are patterned
after the New York Law and the United States Arbitration Act for the refer-
ence to a court of question of law, see Sturges, op. cit., supra, note 2.
The opinion is frequently expressed that the arbitrators should not be al-
lowed to determine finally "the law" of the case.
It is submitted that the problem is less a matter of what questions shall or
shall not be determined by the arbitrators and more a problem involving the
following considerations: (1) Whether the parties shall be allowed to agree
that the arbitrators shall decide all classes of questions affecting the case and
still have the benefit of the statute; (2) whether, if both parties affirmatively
agree therefor, they shall be allowed to have recourse to a court on any aspect
of their controversy; (3) whether, if their agreement is silent on such re-
course, it shall be denied unless both parties agree thereafter to have such resort
to a court. Under the Uniform Statute either party can invoke such procedure
on a "question of law," regardless of the wishes of the adverse party. The
Massachusetts Act is suggestive in this connection. It provides as follows:
"Any question of law may, and upon the request of all parties shall, be re-
ferred by the arbitrator or arbitrators to the court [and] upon application by
a party at any time before the award becomes final under section nineteen,
the superior court may in its discretion instruct the arbitrator or arbitrators
upon a question of substantive law" (Section 20). (Italics are the writer's.)1- 149 N. C. 89, 62 S. E. 780 (1908).
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that "in event the said M and S cannot agree . . . they are em-
powered to choose a third arbitrator, and the award of a majority of
them shall be the amount to which the said Staples shall be entitled."
M and S heard the case, failed to agree and chose a third arbitrator.
There was no hearing before the new board and no opportunity
therefor. M and S reported the evidence to the third in the presence
of each other. S declined to concur in the award of M and the third
arbitrator. It was held that the want of notice and opportunity to
be heard before the new board was fatal to the award.
It may be noted that the third person was not designated as an
"umpire" and the provision for majority award clearly contemplated
that the three should act as the new 'board. Had the third person
been designated an "umpire," and if the majority award provision
had been omitted, it is inferred that the "umpire" would act and
decide alone. In light of the instant case, however, it remains for
future cases to determine whether an "umpire" as distinguished from
a "third arbitrator" must hear the cause de novo after notice. It
may be doubted if the Supreme Court will declare a distinction be-
tween an "umpire" and "third arbitrator" for the purpose of this
issue.
(k) Persons Competent to Practice Before an Arbitral Hearing.
Section 9 of the statute contains another innovation in arbitration
statutes. It provides as follows: "That no one other than a party to
said arbitration, or a person regularly employed by such party for
other purposes, or a practicing attorney-at-law, shall be permitted
by the arbitrator or arbitrators to represent before him or them any
party to the arbitration."
Perhaps the following remarks by Mr. O'Connell, Chairman of
the Arbitration Committee, in the deliberations upon this section by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
sufficiently indicates the purpose of the section:
"Mr. Britton (Ind.) : Mr. Chairman, I rise to raise the inquiry as
to whether Section 9 would prevent a certified public accountant be-
ing called in for an expert opinion.
"Mr. O'Connell (Mass.): That matter was discussed at our
meeting, and a public accountant there thought it would be quite
desirable that they be given that permission and other members of
the Chamber of Commerce said so, too. I would be inclined to re-
gard a certified public accountant, as a witness. I refuse to elevate
him to the dignity of a member of the bar unless I have to. They
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are already doing a great bulk of law business that ought to belong
to lawyers, and I am not one who is going to contribute to extending
that field. That's my feeling in the matter. . . It was our intention
to exclude attorney in fact. In other words, the intention of the com-
mittee was to make a practice of this kind a practice for attorneys,
unless the man himself wanted to try his own case or had somebody in
his regular employment try it for him. In other words, we didn't want
to have a school of arbitration develop outside where they were going
to handle legal questions when they would not be competent to do
so."101
RULES GOVERNING AwARDs
(a) Time Within Which Award Must Be Rendered.
The statute provides as follows: "That if the time within which
the award shall be made is not fixed in the arbitration agreement, the
award must be made within sixty days from the time of the appoint-
ment of the arbitrators, and an award made after the lapse of sixty
days shall have no legal effect unless the parties extend the time in
which said award may be made, which extension or ratification shall
be in writing." (Section 8).102
It would seem that if an arbitration agreement should expire by
its own time limit that it would not be enforceable or irrevocable
after that date. It would seem equally clear, however, that if the
parties continued to participate in a hearing after that date until an
award was rendered that the award should be conclusive and en-
forceable under the act. Section 16, however, seems to indicate a
different conclusion unless the "extension or ratification" is "in
... Handbook, Nat'l Conference of Comrs. on Uniform State Laws, pp. 75,
76 (1924).
In the case of Matter of Kayser, decided by the Supreme Court of New
York (N. Y. L. Journ., January 14, 1925), Mr. Justice Wagner remarked upon
the appearance of lawyers before arbitral boards as follows: "My view is that
whether counsel may be heard or participate in the arbitration proceedings
rests entirely in the sound discretion of the arbitrators. The very purpose of
arbitration is to obtain inexpensive, expeditious and final determination of
disputes on the merits, free from technical rules and legal formalities. . . . The
presence of counsel fortified with 'that wilderness of single instance' and with
legal maxim and some legal anachronisms would tend rather to confusion and
protraction than prompt decision. Besides, if one side employs counsel, a
burden is cast on the other to do likewise, with resulting added expense. To
permit participation by counsel as a matter of right would be fatal to the
efficiency of arbitration."
102 There are obvious difficulties with this section. For example, in the
common case, where each party appoints one arbitrator with authority in the
two to choose a third arbitrator or umpire forthwith, or, "if they cannot
agree," clearly there will be a variety of situations wherein the question will
arise as to the time of "the appointment of the arbitrators" for the purposes
of this section.
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writing." Moreover, under section 20, which prescribes what papers
must be filed with a motion to the court to confirm, vacate, modify
or correct an award, "each written extension of time, if any within
which to make the award," is included. Why a writing is considered
so important in such a case does not readily appear.
(b) When Is An Award Rendered-Notice-Delivery.
The time when a given award is made or rendered assumes im-
portance under the statute and in common law arbitrations. Section
8 of the act, quoted under the previous topic heading, prescribes that
the award "must be made" within sixty days from the appointment
of the arbitrators unless the arbitration agreement provides a dif-
ferent time. Under common law rules the submission agreement is
revocable in both senses of that term until an award is rendered, but
not afterwards.
There are no common law decisions in North Carolina which de-
termine whether publication or communication of a decision to the
parties is necessary to an award-rendered. If the award in the par-
ticular case does not require special formalities, as, for example, in
case of an award in a dispute over title to land, which must be in
writing to be conclusive or enforceable, it would seem plausible to
hold, at least for the purposes of the foregoing questions of revoca-
bility, that the arbitrators have made their award when they have
agreed, even informally, upon their decision although it has not been
communicated to the parties.1 03 It has been decided in a common
law case that delivery of a documentary award to the parties is not
"essential to its efficacy" at least where the submission agreement
does not require it.104
It should be noted, however, that section 14 of. the statute pre-
scribes that the award of the arbitrators "shall be drawn up in writ-
ing and signed by the arbitrators . . ." and that "the arbitrators shall
deliver a true copy thereof to each of the parties thereto, without
delay." It may be argued from this provision that an award cannot
be made for the purpose of section 8 until at least the requisite
writing and signing are had-that it cannot be held that an award is
otade when the arbitrators reach a decision. In reply it may be urged
that the requirement that "the award . . . shall be drawn up in
writing and signed" clearly presumes something by "the award," and
103 Consult Zell and Sons v. Johnston, 76 N. C. 302 (1877).
Crawford v. Orr, 84 N. C. 246 (1881).
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also that there seems to be nothing in the statute to indicate that the
decision of the arbitrators shall have no effect as an award before it
is "drawn up and signed." As concerns delivery: the arbitrators are
required to deliver copies "without delay." It seems scarcely plausi-
ble to argue that the decision of the arbitrators is to have no effect as
an award until such delivery of copies.
On the other hand, for purposes of proceedings to enforce or to
vacate or to modify or correct an award under the statute, the pre-
scribed writing, signing and delivery may well be prerequisites. Like-
wise in common law cases it would seem fair, generally at least, to
condition a party's responsibility on an award upon a communication
of its terms from the arbitrators. In case of a common law award
in a controversy over title to land, clearly a writing is a prerequisite
to'its enforceability and conclusiveness.
(c) Requisite That the Award Follow the Submission.
Section 16 of the statute provides that it is a cause to vacate an
award "(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers." It is
made a cause to modify or correct an award in Section 12 "(b)
Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them."
It is not entirely clear what distinctions are intended by these
two sections. Possibly it is to be understood that it is cause only to
modify or correct an award where the arbitrators have awarded
upon a matter which was not submitted to them but which can be
readily separated from the matters which were submitted and which
can be expurgated from the award without affecting it as a decision
on the merits of the matters in issue which were submitted. Such
construction would make the provisions consistent with common law
decisions in such cases.' 0 5
In the common law cases it is clear that the documentary award
need not recite the ancient formula de et super praemises or that it
is rendered in compliance with the submission. It is not necessary
that it describe the controversy in the precise terms in which it is set
forth in the submission agreement; it is sufficient if there is identity
of controversy. The supreme court has outlined pertinent general
regulations in the case of Crawford v. Orr'0 6 as follows: "The law
5 See Stevens v. Brown, 82 N. C. 460 (1800) ; Knight v. Holden, 104 N. C.107, 10 S. E. 90 (1889); Robertson v. Marshall, 155 N. C. 167, 71 S. E. 67(1911); Geiger v. Caldwell, 184 N. C. 387, 114 S. E. 497 (1922).
...Supra, note 104; Thompson v. Childs, 29 N. C. 435 (1847) ; Zell v. John-
ston, 76 N. C. 302; Knighiv. Holden, 104 N. C. 107, 10 S. E. 90 (1889).
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does not require that the award shall in direct terms declare a com-
pliance with the conditions essential to its validity. This will be
assumed when the contrary does not appear, and any material de-
parture from the terms of the submission must be shown by him
who alleges it and seeks to be relieved from its operation. . . . In-
deed, the award should, so far as practicable and without needless
recitals, be a simple and succinct response to the inquiry involved in
the reference in analogy to a jury verdict, and this is all that is
needful to its validity."
Although it is presumed that the documentary award follows the
submission unless the contrary clearly appears when the two docu-
ments (if there are documents) are compared it is clearly settled in
the common law cases that the award is neither conclusive nor en-
forceable if it is shown that the arbitrators decided too many'0 7 or
too few'0 8 matters of controversy under the given submission. How-
ever, as heretofore noted, if the unauthorized excess can be readily
separated from the authorized parts of the award it will be sustained
pro tanto. On the other hand, if the award embraces only a part of
the matter or matters submitted it is not clear that the partial award
will be sustained.
Under section 14 of the statute the arbitrators are expressly
authorized "in their discretion," to make "a partial award which shall
be enforceable in the same manner as the final award." Since this
partial award is distinguished from "the final award," it is inferred
that the provision is not designed to authorize arbitrators 'to pick
and choose what matters they will decide out of all of the matters
submitted, but rather, to authorize the arbitrators, in their discretion,
to return an award upon an "independent issue" without waiting for
an ultimate decision of all matters in a single award. Presumably
the question will always be open to court review in each case whether
a given "partial award" does involve an "independent issue." Pre-
sumably "the final award" is the last "partial award" in such cases.
While it is true that the arbitrators must award upon no more
and no less than is submitted to them it must be noted that the ques-
tion is not one of merely construing the two documents. While the
presumption of validity may be rebutted by showing that the award
does not follow the submission when the two documents are com-
pared the award may be sustained by evidence as to what matters
1 Cullifer v. Gilliam, 31 N. C. 126. See also cases cited, supra, note 106.
OU See Patton v. Garrett, 116 N. C. 847, 21 S. E. 679 (1895).
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were in fact laid before the arbitrators at the hearing. The arbi-
trators are competent to testify at least to the -point that more mat-
ters were in fact prosecuted before them than are set forth in the
submission agreement in order to support the more comprehensive
award.' 0 9 Similar evidence to the effect that some matters enumer-
ated in the submission were not laid before them by concurrence of
both parties would seem equally competent to support a restricted
award, but no cases in point have been discovered. This rule (or
these rules) rest upon the thought that the award should be sus-
tained if it decides the issues which were in fact laid before the arbi-
trators, rather than be defeated merely for want of harmony as a
document with the submission document.
Since the topic under consideration is thought of in terms of
jurisdiction of the arbitrators apparently the question can be raised
at any time in the common law cases, to test the conclusiveness or
enforceability of an award. No case has 'been found, however,
where the issue has ,been raised after an action has 'been brought on
the award and judgment recovered therein. The parallel question
arises under the statute whether an award can be challenged because
it does not follow the submission after the court has entered an order
confirming the award and a judgment or decree has been entered in
conformity therewith pursuant to section 19.110
(d) Form, Execution and Disposition of the Award.
Section 14 of the statute prescribes that "the award . . . shall
be drawn up in -writing and signed -by the arbitrators or a majority of
them . . . (and) . . . upon the making of an award, the arbitrators
shall deliver a true copy thereof to each of the parties thereto, or
their attorneys, without delay." This section and pertinent common
law cases have already been discussed 'both as to matters of form
and of delivery in another connection. (See (b) When Is An Award
Rendered-Notice-Delivery).
Awards in General-Formal Requisites.
It is believed to be a safe generalization of the common law cases
that in cases where claims for money and personal property are sub-
mitted to arbitration that an award will be conclusive and enforceable
' Brown v. Brown, 49 N. C. 123 (1856) ; Walker v. Walker, 60 N. C. 259;
Osborne v. Colvert, 86 N. C. 170 (1882). Compare Scott v. Green, 89 N. C.
278 (1883) ; Millinery Co. v. Insurance Co., 160 N. C. 130, 75 S. E. 944 (1912).
See Bryant v. Fisher, 85 N. C. 69 (1881) ; compare Anders v. Anders, 31
N. C. 214 (1848). See also Walker v. Walker, 60 N. C. 259 (1864).
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without a writing unless the submission agreement requires it. It is
not necessary that the award expressly require the losing party to
pay or to otherwise perform. It is necessary, however, that his in-
debtedness or duty be decided and reported as distinguished from
being a report of a mere calculation.1 11
Awards It Disputes Involving Land-Formal Requisites.
In view of the settled rule that the submission of a controversy
involving title to land must be in writing, and perhaps under seal, it
seems dear that an award in such case must likewise be in writing,
if not also under seal, to be conclusive or enforceable. The writing
is deemed to be required by the Statute of Frauds.1 1 2
While the Statute of Frauds regulates the submission and award
in such cases the extent of its application remains to be tested in the
cases where testimonial evidence is offered to show what matters
were in fact laid before the arbitrators in order to sustain an award
which as a document is more or less comprehensive than the terms
of the submission paper. If the matters of excess or deficiency do
not themselves involve a matter of controversy over a title to land,
it would seem plausible to argue that the evidence would be admissa-
ble. But if a title to land is involved in such matters, it remains for
the supreme court to choose betwen applying the Statute of Frauds
and admitting the evidence to sustain the award as in other cases.
While it may be doubtful whether a seal is necessary to an award
rendered in a common law arbitration involving a controversy over
a title to land it seems plausible to argue that section 14 of the statute
resolves that uncertainty in case of statutory awards since it requires
no more than a writing. On the other hand it may be argued, of
course, that section 14 purports to do no more than to enumerate
the minimum requirements for all statutory awards and that it does
not imply that no further formalities shall be imposed in special
cases.
(e) Requisite That an Award Itemize or Particularize the Matters
Decided.
The statute prescribes that "the award shall definitely deal with
all matters of difference in the submission requiring settlement."
'u Barretts v. Patterson, 1 N. C. 126 (1799) ; and see McKOneal v. Butler,
14 N. C. 94 (1831) ; Carter v. Samus, 20 N. C. 182 (1838) ; Cheek v. Davidson,
36 N. C. 68 (1840).
'See Pearnall v. Mayers, 60 N. C. 549 (1870); and cases cited, supra,
notes 49-52.
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(Section 14). It may be doubted if this provision does more than
require the general common law requisite of certainty and the gen-
eral requisite that the award shall follow the submission as a matter
of documents. It does not expressly require each matter of differ-
ence to be listed.
In the common law cases the supreme court has taken pains to
reiterate its approval of lump-sum awards and awards which con-
cisely embrace the whole controversy. In the absence of a stipula-
tion therefor in the submission it is settled that an award need not
itemize the matters of dispute and allocate to them corresponding
portions of the award. It is likewise settled that it is not necessary
that an award shall contain assignments of reasons for itself in
whole or in part. The following statement of the supreme court in
Patton v. Baird recurs in the opinions: "Arbitrators are no more
bound to go into particulars, and assign reasons for their award, than
a jury is for its verdict. Their duty is best discharged by a simple
announcement of the result of their investigations."-11 3
(f) The Requisite of Certainty-Finality-Coinpleteness.
An award under the statute must "definitely deal with all matters
submitted" (section 14), and it is made a cause to vacate an award
that the arbitrators have "so imperfectly" executed their powers
"that a mutual final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made."
From the common law cases it is clear that want of certainty,
finality or completeness of an award defeats its conclusiveness and
enforceability. If it is unintelligible, if it is not certain to "common
intent" so that it is a decision of and end to the matter in controversy
it will be disregarded."14
In challenging an award for uncertainty, the supreme court has
declared that the uncertainty "must expressly appear on the face of
the award, or by averment.""15
The documentary award may be rendered certain by construing
it in the light of the submission, or by matters pleaded in an action
to enforce it, or by reference to plans and documents to which it
'42 N. C. 255 (1851); Blossom v. Van Amnringe, 63 N. C. 65 (1868);
Lusk, Assignee, v. Clayton, 70 N. C. 184 (1874) ; Osborne v. Colvert, 83 N. C.
365 (1880) ; Ezzell v. Lumber Co., 130 N. C. 205, 41 S. E. 99 (1902) ; Man gum
v. Mangum, 151 N. C. 270, 65 S. E. 1004 (1909).
"'Millinery Co. v. Insurance Co., 160 N. C. 130, 75 S. E. 944 (1912) ; Ball
v. McCormack, 172 N. C. 677, 90 S. E. 916 (1916).
"Carter v. Samus, 20 N. C. 182 (1838)- reference of a pending action.
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refers, or by testimony of the arbitrators concerning the matters
which were laid before them. That the submission document is
under seal does not exclude such evidence. 1
16
The award may fail, however, if it purports to be uncertain, or,
if it expressly leaves certain matters to further determination. It
is then not "complete" and "final." Apparently such defect cannot
be cured. Thus 'where parties submitted disputed accounts between
the parties growing out of their business as cattle dealers, the follow-
ing clause in the award was held fatal to the conclusiveness of the
award: "All outstanding debts for cattle, if any such, are joint.""17
Again, although the award is certain and final as a document,
testimony is admissible to show that reservations were made by the
aibitrators when they published the document to the parties. Thus
testimony of an arbitrator is admissible to show that he consented to
the award only on the condition that the law of the case was de-
termined to be as he assumed; that if the law were otherwise he
would not agree to the award as written. At least since the court
declared that the law 'was different from what the arbitrator sup-
posed the award was held invalid.1 18 It may be doubted if the
results would have 'been different if the law had been otherwise.
(g) Effect of an Award on Title to Land or Chattels.
The statute has no express provision in point. From earliest
common law cases the supreme court has shown reluctance to declare
that an award rendered under a submission of a controversy over
title to land operates as a "conveyance" of the title to the land.119
It is not clear, however, that any case has necessitated a decision of
that question for no award has been discovered which has purported
by its terms to presently transfer a title to the land in controversy.
In some cases, however, the form of the award in this respect does
not appear. The question would not seem to be involved where the
award orders a conveyance to be made. Moreover, it is not clear
that an award which purports to 'be a present conveyance will not be
construed as an order to convey.' 20 The question may arise also
... Bryant v. Miner; Cameron and Norwood's Reports, 313 (1801) ; Barretts
v. Patterson, 1 N. C. 126 (1799); Moore v. Gherkin, 44 N. C. 73 (1853);
Crawford v. Orr, 84 N. C. 246 (1881) ; and see cases cited supra, notes 53-56.
Patton v. Baird, 42 N. C. 255 (1851).
"Herndon v. Insurance Co., 110 N. C. 279, 14 S. E. 742 (1892).
Crissinan v. Crissman, 27 N. C. 498 (1845) ; Gaylord v. Gaylord, 48 N. C.
367 (1856); Thompson v. Deans, 59 N. C. 22 (1860).
See Thompson v. Deans, supra, note 119..
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when an issue is made as to the necessity of a seal on an award in
such cases. If it were held to be a conveyance it is inferred that a
seal would be necessary to its conclusiveness and enforceability as a
common law award.
The preponderance of theory expressed by the court is that an
award in such cases is analogous to an executory contract to convey;
it will be specifically enforced.121 If it is in writing, but only if it
is, it is conclusive of the rights of the parties so that it can be pleaded
to defeat an action of ejectment which is brought in disregard of the
award.' 22 Whether it will support an action of ejectment, however,
-- even if it is under seal-has not been determined.
In case of 'boundary line disputes the court has repeated a doctrine
which is to the effect that the award is to be regarded as merely the
ascertainment of a fact, the location of the line.' 23 This theory is
reiterated although the court has been observed to remark that "the
authority to declare and establish the [boundary] line in dispute
necessarily implied the right to so fix the line that one of the parties
would get less land than he claimed"124 (Italics are the writer's).
Clearly, however, the submission and award must be in writing in
such cases to be conclusive or enforceable.
In cases of disputed ownership of personal property it is inferred
that the supreme court considers that an award can and does deter-
mine title to chattels when and if it purports to do so.' 25 Likewise
that it can and does, if it purports to do so, effect the assignment of
a chose in action.126
(h) Awards Requiring Future Action by the Parties.
The cases are few where the award does not contemplate future
action by at least one of the parties. Even in an award on a money
claim the future payment of the award is contemplated. But is an
award to be sustained which requires other future conduct than the
payment of money? The question suggests the possibility of an
award for such conduct as may require the processes of a court of
equity to enforce it.
1 Thompson v. Deans, 59 N. C. 22 (1860).
' See cases cited, supra, note 119.
' Gaylord v. Gaylord, 48 N. C. 367 (1856). Compare Crawford v. Orr, 84
N. C. 246 (1881) ; Mayberry v. Mayberry, 121 N. C. 248, 28 S. E. 349 (1897).
'Pearson, v. Barringer, 109 N. C. 398, 13 S. E. 942 (1891)-reference of a
pending action.
'See Torrence v. Graham, 18 N. C. 284 (1835).
' See Scott v. Green, 89 N. C. 278 (1883).
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Section 19 of the statute provides that upon the granting of an
order confirming, vacating, modifying or correcting an award that
"judgment or decree shall ,be entered in conformity" with the order.
It seems clear therefore that a statutory award will be confirmed
under the statute although it requires performance other than the
payment of money, and that a "decree" may be procured if necessary
to enforce its terms.
In a common law case specific performance was ordered in an
equitable action to enforce the award as follows: The award di-
rected the defendant to return to the plaintiff two certain notes
which the defendant had hypothecated with a bank as collateral se-
curity for a loan. The court remarked as follows: "Undoubtedly it
is one of the requisites of a valid award that its performance be pos-
sible, but . .. this principle is only held to exclude awards impos-
sible of performance in the nature of things, as 'a direction to execute
a conveyance on or before a day that has already passed,' or 'to do or
obtain something which the party had no legal right to procure or
enjoin,' as to 'give some third person as surety' on whom the party
had no claim .. . 'but in this case, as shown, the notes, with other
collateral, were only hypothecated to the bank to secure an indebted-
ness of $500. The defendant, ... had the legal right to redeem
the notes, and the award, in this instance, is no more impossible than
an order to pay a sum of money or*do any other lawful act within
the power of the defendant."'1 27
Since the arbitrators are functi officio after the award is rendered
it seems clear that awards of future conduct should not be pred-
icated upon the satisfaction or further review of the arbitrators as
such. Likewise it seems dear that such awards must satisfy the
general requirements of certainty, finality and completeness concern-
ing what performance is required.
(i) Alternative Awards.
The statute does not mention alternative awards. It is not readily
gathered from the statute whether an arbitration agreement authoriz-
ing such an award would be "in conformity with the provisions of
[the] act" as provided in section 1.
The following award, however, was sustained against an attack
'Robertson v. Marshall, 155 N. C. 167, 71 S. E. 67 (1911). See also
Thompson v. Deans, 59 N. C. 22 (1860), cited, supra, note 121; Bryant v.
Fisher, 85 N. C. 69 (1881). Compare Cutter v. Cutter, 169 N. C. 482. 86 S. E.
301 (1915).
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that it was uncertain and lacked finality in the common law case of
Bryant v. Milner:28 "We . . .having been chosen to arbitrate a
certain matter of controversy 'between James Milner, of the one
part, and James Bryant, of the other part, do award, that the said
Milner shall pay unto the said Bryant fifty dollars, or secure the
same to be paid, on or before Christmas next, by giving his bond with
security."
(j) Default Awards. Consult Proceedings in Absence of a Party-
Ex Parte Proceedings, supra.
(k) Partial Awards.
The question of partial awards has already been discussed in con-
nection with the general requisite that an award must follow the
submission. As then noted section 14 of the act authorizes the
arbitrators, "in their discretion," to "first make a partial award which
shall be enforceable in the same manner as the final award." The
Uniform Act and the Illinois arbitration act are the only American
statutes which authorize such awards. It seems clear that this pro-
vision will become involved with the general requisite that an award
must follow the submission and the provision of section 16 which
provides that it shall 'be cause to vacate an award where the arbi-
trators have "so imperfectly executed them [their powers] that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted
was not made."
(1) Majority Award.
Section 14 expressly contemplates an award by a majority of
the arbitrators. It is not clear, however, that a majority award is
authorized by the section unless the parties provided therefor. The
section reads as follows: "That the award of the arbitrators, or a
majority of them, shall be drawn up in writing and signed by the
arbitrators or a majority of them" and "the arbitrators may, in their
discretion first make a partial award which shall be enforceable in
the same manner as the final award. . . ." Does it authorize a ma-
jority award without regard to the agreement of the parties or is it
predicated upon an agreement of the parties which authorizes a
majority award? If the parties provide for a unanimous award in
Cameron and Norwood's Reports 313 (1801). With Waugh v. Mitchell,
21 N. C. 510 (1837); compare section 13 of the new statute, discussed supra
under topic heading-Proceeding at the Arbitral Hearing-Disposition of Ques-
tions of Law.
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the arbitration agreement can they bring it within the act? Will a
majority award be valid under such a submission agreement? In
view of the common law rule it would seem that the statute should
have been more specific and explicit on these points.
In the common law cases it is settled that the award must be
unanimous unless the parties authorize an award by a lesser number
of the arbitrators, and in such case the number so authorized must
join.129 However, if a third arbitrator is authorized to serve with
two others, but only when and as the two disagree, such third arbi-
trator is not a necessary party to the award,--at least it was so held
in a case where the two had had no disagreements. 130
That more of the quorum than is necessary participate in making
the decision and in executing the documentary award is held to be
immaterial. Thus, where a reference was to six named arbitrators
with a majority award authorized, it was held that the award was
valid although more than a majority participated in making it.131
(m) Awards of an Umpire.
As already pointed out the statute does not mention an umpire.
In the common law cases it is apparently settled that an umpire
has power to render the award alone where he is appointed as an
umpire of the whole controversy when and after originally appointed
arbitrators have failed to agree upon an award.132 In such cases,
however, as in the other cases noted in the preceding section, it is no
objection to his award that the original arbitrators participate with
him at the hearing and in making the decision and join with him in
executing the paper award.
PROCEDURE To ENFORCE AwAEDs-AwAIRDs EFFECTIVE AS
JUDGMENTS-METHODS OF EXECUTION
Provisions of the Statute.
The statute provides a summary method for the enforcement of a
statutory award which probably is in lieu of the common law method
of bringing an action in court to enforce the award. The following
procedure is prescribed: (1) Motion to the court "for an order con-
firming the award" upon five days written notice served upon the
adverse party, or his attorney. This procedure may be initiated at
Oakley v. Anderson, 93 N. C. 108 (1885).
'Geigerv . Caldwell, 184 N. C. 387, 114 S. E. 497 (1922).
' Carter v. Samus, 20 N. C. 182.
' See Stevens v. Brown, 82 N. C. 460 (1880).
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"any time within three months after the award is made, unless the
parties shall extend the time in writing." (2) If the order is granted
"judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith." (3)
Upon filing the above motion, the moving party shall file with the
clerk of the court the following papers: "(a) The written contract
or a verified copy thereof containing the agreement for the submis-
sion; the selection or appointment of the arbitrator or arbitrators,
and each written extension of the time, if any within which to make
the award. (b) The award. (c) Every notice, affidavit and other
paper used upon an application to confirm, modify or vacate the
award, and each order made upon such an application." (Sections
13, 19 and 20.)
Award Effective as a Judgment
When the foregoing judgment or decree is entered it "shall be
entered (or docketed) as if it were rendered in an action," and
where so entered (or docketed) "shall have the same force and
effect . . . as if it had been rendered in the court in which it is
entered." (Section 21.)
Methods of Execution.
When the judgment or decree is entered, as provided in Section
21, such judgment or decree "shall have the same force and effect,
in all respects, as, and be subject to all the provisions of law relating
to a judgment or decree; and it may be enforced, as if it had been
rendered in the court in which it is entered." (Section 21.)
Two matters of special importance seem to be made sufficiently
clear by this section as follows: (1) That a "decree" shall be entered
in conformity with an order confirming an award although it may
require such conduct as would not be compelled by a court of equity
under general equity practice; for example, an award that one party
deliver to the other certain designated but non-unique chattels. (2)
That executions which are allowed on a judgment or decree which is
rendered in a civil action are available for the enforcement of a.
judgment or decree which is entered under the statute.
An award rendered in a common law arbitration, other than in a
reference of a pending action under a rule of court, cannot be entered
Cases at Common Law.
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4irectly as a judgment of a court.1 33 The successful party must bring
an action in court to enforce the award. Apparently this is his only
remedy unless an arbitration bond was given to abide and perform
the award.' 34 When such a bond has been given the plaintiff's recov-
-ery is limited to his actual damages-at least where plaintiff's dam-
ages are shown to be less than the penal sum.'3 5
When the successful party sues to recover on an award, appar-
ently the submission agreement as well as the award and the defend-
ant's default is a necessary part of his cause of action for purposes of
-pleading and proof of a cause of action. In the case of Ball v. Mc-
Cormazk the court summarized the matter as follows: "The aver-
-ment and proof of the making of an agreement of submission and
its contents constitute necessarily the first step towards enforcing
the award. The validity of the award is primarily and essentially
dependent upon the agreement of the parties. Ordinarily this will
be easily proved by a production of the paper, if it was written; but
if no submission be produced, and there be no evidence of it, the
mere fact of the existence of an instrument purporting to be an
award, though ancient, will not be allowed to have any effect."' 3 6
The case of Sprinkle v. Sprinkle137 should also be noted in this
-connection. It involved the application of the Statute of Limitations
to an action brought to recover on the following money award:
"That J. H. Sprinkle shall pay to T. Sprinkle. (Sums of money
therein stated.).
"This 28 January, 1898.
P. T. Lehman
W. S. Martin
J. F. Griffith (seal)."
'Metcalf v. Guthrie, 94 N. C. 447 (1886); Derule v. Scott, 53 N. C. 73
(1860) ; Hoover v. Neighbors, 64 N. C. 429 (1870) ; Lusk, Assignee v. Clayton,
70 N. C. 184 (1874) ; Robbins v. Killebrew, 95 N. C. 19 (1886) ; Peele v. No.
& So. Carolina Ry. Co., 159 N. C. 60, 74 S. E. 592 (1912).
" See, however, Thompson v. Childs, 29 N. C. 435 (1847) ; Patton v. Gar-
rett, 116 N. C. 847, 21 S. E. 679 (1895); Simpson v. M'Bee, 19 N. C. 229
(1837).
"'Henderson v. Cansler, 65 N. C. 542 (1871). Compare Barretts v. Patter-
.son, 1 N. C. 126. Compare cases cited, supra, note 70. Consult Pass v.
Critcher, 112 N. C. 405, 17 IS. E. 9 (1893), concerning the extent of the financial
responsibility of surety on a bond to abide an award.
172 N. C. 677, 90 S. E. 916 (1916) ; Millinery Co. v. Insurance Co., 160
N. C. 130, 75 S. E. 944 (1912). Consult Clanton v. Price, Adm., 90 N. C. 96
(1884). And consult cases cited, infra, note 139.
159 N. C. 1, 74 S. E. 454 (1912).
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A partial payment was made on the award March 10, 1903.
The summons was issued January 20, 1911. There was no evi-
dence of the submission; whether it was pleaded does not appear.
Defendant pleaded a three and ten years statute applicable to "an
action upon a contract, obligation, or liability arising out of a con-
tract, express or implied." The three year term applied to a simple
"contract." The ten year limitation applied to a sealed "contract."
It was held that the three year statute applied and barred the plain-
tiff's action. The court said:
"If he (plaintiff) relied on the fact that the szubmission to arbi-
tration was under seal, or that the arbitrators, Lehman and Martin,
adopted the seal, following the name of the arbitrator Griffith, it was
incumbent on him to offer evidence of these facts, and having failed
to do so, we must consider the case as upon a submission and an
award, not under seal. and in so considering it, the nature of the
obligation imposed on the defendant will aid in determining whether
the statute of limitations of three years or of ten years applies.
is' We conclude, therefore, that the cause of action by the plain-
tiff is one arising oui of a contract, not under seal, and as more than
three years elapsed after the date of the alleged payment, before the
commencement of this action, that the right of recovery is barred."
(Italics are the writer's.)
It is inferred that the plaintiff lost under the three year statute
because he did not base his cause of action on a submission under
seal. Some doubts are left by the opinion, however, as follows:
(1) If the award had been under seal, would the three year statute
have applied although the submission were not under seal? (2)
When does the cause of action arise: on the date of the award, or
at a date fixed therein for performance, or does it arise at some prior
time? As respects the last question, however, it would seem quite
clear that it would be held that an action for non-performance of
an award does not arise prior to the date of the award or the date
stated therein for performance, and that a statute of limitations
would not begin to run prior to that date.
Where an award requires such conduct of a party as courts of
equity are in the habit of compelling specific performance the suc-
cessful party can appeal to a court of equity for such relief.138
In asserting an award as a bar to an action brought upon a cause
which has been arbitrated, apparently the same general rules apply
' See Thompson v. Deans, 59 N. C. 22 (1860) ; Crawford v. Orr, 84 N. C.
246 (1881); Metcalf v. Guthrie, 94 N. C. 447 (1886).
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with respect to pleading and proof of the submission and award by
the defendant as apply to a plaintiff who seeks to recover on an
award.13 9 Non-performance of the award by the plaintiff in such
case, however, would not seem to be a necessary part of the defend-
ant's defense. Moreover the supreme court has intimated that the
defendant's default on the award is not material.' 40
PROCEDURE AND CAUSES TO VACATE, MODIFY OR CORRECT AN AWARD,
DISPOSITION OF CASE: IF APPLICATION GRANTED-IF
APPLICATION DENIED
Provisions of the Statute.
The statute provides a summary procedure for vacating and for
modifying or correcting an award which is governed by the statute,
as follows: (1) Motioi to the court to vacate, modify or correct the
award, on notice to the adverse party, or his attorney, "which shall
be served . . . within three months after an award is filed or
delivered, as prescribed by law for service of notice of a motion in
an action." An order of stay of any proceedings to enforce the
award may also be had at such time. (2) The moving party shall
file with the clerk of court the same papers as are required of a party
who proceeds to have an award confirmed, "unless the same have
theretofore been filed."
If an order is granted that the award be vacated or modified or
corrected "judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity there-
with," which, when so entered (or docketed), "shall have the same
force and effect, in all respects, as, and be subject to all the provisions
of law relating to a judgment or decree; and it may be enforced, as
if it had been rendered in the court in which it is entered." How-
ever, "when an award is vacated, and the time, within which the
agreement required the award to be made, has not expired, the court
may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators." Where
the award is to be modified or corrected the order of the court "must
modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof."
(Sections 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20.)
Causes to vacate an award which is governed by the statute are
set forth in Section 16, as follows:
'Ball v. MeCormack, 172 N. C. 677, 90 S. E. 916 (1916); and see Torrence
Exrs. v. Graham, 18 N. C. 284 (1835) ; Power Co. v. Nazigation Co., 159 N. C.
393, 75 S. E. 29 (1912).
" See Moore v. Austin, 85 N. C. 179 (1881) ; Cheatham v. Rowland, 105
N. C. 218, 10 S. E. 986 (1890).
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"(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or
other undue means.
"(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them.
"(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct, in refus-
ing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in re-
fusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or
of any other misbehavior, by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced.
"(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imper-
fectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made."
Causes to modify and correct an award which is governed by the
statute are set forth in Section 17, as follows:
"(a) Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an
evident mistake in the description of any person, thing or property,
referred to in the award.
"(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not sub-
mitted to them.
"(c) Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form, not
affecting the merits of the controversy."
Cases at Common Law.
Few cases have dealt with a direct attack upon an award by a bill
in equity to have it vacated. In most of the common law cases the
conclusiveness of the award has been challenged by the defendant
in an action brought to enforce it, or its conclusiveness has been put
in issue by a plaintiff who has attempted to bring an action to re-
cover on the original cause in disregard of the award.
An equitable action to vacate an award will not lie where the
matters in contest can be asserted as a legal defense to an action to
enforce the award. Matters going to the jurisdiction of the arbi-
trators, such as a denial of an opportunity to be heard, failure or
refusal to decide all matters submitted, or a decision of matters
which were not submitted, the revocation of the submission before
award rendered, an insufficient quorum, an award rendered by an
insufficient number of arbitrators, award uncertain, and like causes
are valid legal defenses and apparently cannot be made the basis of
an equitable action to vacate the award. 141 Matters of "fraud,"
I See Gardner v. Marsters, 56 N. C. 462 (1857) ; Eaton v. Eaton 33 N. C.
490 (1850); see 43 N. C. 102 (1851); Jones v. Frazier, 8 N. C. 379 (1821).
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"undue means," and "partiality" or "corruption" of the arbitrators
are sufficient cause for affirmative action to vacate an award. 142
APPELLATE REVIEW
Section 22 of the statute provides that "an appeal may be taken
from the final judgment or decree entered by the court."
Some uncertainty obviously attaches to the term "final judgment."
For example, it may be doubted if an appeal will lie where a judg-
ment or decree is entered on an order vacating an award and the
court in its discretion directs a re-hearing by the arbitrators, as it is
authorized to do under section 16.143
EXPENSES, FEE AND COSTS
The statute has no provision in point except that "fees for such
attendance [by witnesses at the arbitral hearing] shall be the same as
the fees of witnesses in the Superior Court." (Section 10.)
The rule is settled in common law cases that the costs are to be
borne equally by the parties unless the award provides otherwise. 144
Whether the arbitrators have power, without express authorization
by the parties, to award the entire expenses of an arbitration, includ-
ing their own fees, to one party seems doubtful. 1 45
..2 See Devereaux v. Burgwin, 33 N. C. 490 (1850) ; Eaton v. Eaton, 43 N.
C. 102 (1851). Concerning the plaintiff's burden of proof in such cases, see
Perry v. Insurance Co., 137 N. C. 402, 49 S. E. 889 (1905) ; and see Hemphill
v. Guither, 180 N. C. 604, 105 S. E. 183 (1920).
For generalizations in the common law cases concerning the conclusiveness
of awards with respect to unethical conduct and mistake on the part of arbi-
trators, see: Williams & Bro. v. Branning Mfg. Co., 153 N. C. 7, 68 S. E. 902(1910) ; Mayberry v. Mayberry, 121 N. C. 248, 28 S. E. 349 (1897); Lumber
Co. v. Briggs-Shaffner Co., 186 N. C. 347, 119 S. E. 484 (1923); Eaton v.
Eaton, 43 N. C. 102 (1851) ; Perry v. Insurance Co., 137 N. C. 402, 49 S. E.
889 (1905) ; Ezzell v. Lumber Co., 130 N. C. 205, 41 S. E. 99 (1902); Leach v.Harris, 69 N. C. 532 (1873) ; Ryan v. Blount et al Ezrs., 16 N. C. 382 (1820) ;
Pierce v. Perkins, 17 N. C. 250 (1832) ; Crissnan v. Crissman, 27 N. C. 498(1845) ; Gardner v. Marsters, 56 . C. 462 (1857); Walker v. Walker, 60 N. C.259 (1860) ; King v. The Falls of the Neuse Mfg. Co., 79 N. C. 360 (1878)
Patton v. Garrett, 116 N. C. 847, 21 S. E. 679 (1895).
It is not clear whether arbitrators are competent witnesses to impeach theiraward in such cases. See Jones v. Fra.ier, 8 N. C. 379 (1821). The statement
recurs in the opinions that the mistake must appear on the face of the award.
Ryan v. Blount et al Exrs., 16 N. C. 382 (1820) ; Wyatt v. The Lynchburg etc.
Ry. Co., 110 N. C. 245, 14 S. E. 683 (1892) ; Patton v. Garrett, 116 N. C. 847,
21 S. E. 679 (1895). Compare Herndon v. Insurance Co., supra, note 118.
..See Warren v. Stancill, 117 N. C. 112, 23 S. E. 216 (1895).
."Derule v. Scott, 53 N. C. 73 (1860)-reference of a pending action;
Harralson v. Pleasants, 61 N. C. 365 (1867), same. Gardner v. Marsters, 56
N. C. 462 (1857).
24 See Stevens v. Brov,, 82 N. C. 460 (1880)-reference of pending action.
Compare Blossom v. Van Ainringe, 63 N. C. 65 (1868), same. See also Kelly
v. The Lynchburg etc. Ry. Co., 110 N. C. 431, 15 S. E. 200 (1892), same.
